Economic Clichés: Is There a ‘Knowledge Economy’?

This is a crosspost translated from Tatlin’s Toren.

In light of the upcoming elections in the Netherlands, the airwaves are filled with talk of the ‘knowledge economy’. It is often far from clear what is meant by this, moreover because it is not a term with a clearly defined meaning in economic theory. The impression therefore rises that it is a term mainly used to justify more investment in education. However, more specifically it seems to be used most frequently by liberal parties to abandon redistributional policies in favor of such investment, while still keeping up the appearance of being committed to the plight of the ‘low opportunity’ population, the importance of social mobility, and so forth. It is therefore worthwhile to analyze this term as it is used, all the more because it is such a fixed part of the arsenal of economic clichés politicians have ready to justify arbitrarily any given policy proposal.

The ‘knowledge economy’ as post-industrial society

The most immediately significant aspect of the ‘knowledge economy’ is that it is an impossibility in its literal sense. There is much ado about the historical shift in the division of labor from the heavy weight in industry to the predominance of the services sector. Such shifts have of course happened before in economic history – if the Industrial Revolution means anything, then surely its meaning rests in an analogous shift from agriculture to industrial production. But against this, two points must be noted. Firstly, the ‘services sector’ is not a clearly defined term either. It is worth remembering that in the 19th century services were also a not inconsiderable part of the economy, but at the time this concerned very different branches of the economy, particularly domestic and transport services. When labor was cheap and transport expensive, many working class men worked as teamsters and railway personnel, and many working class women as domestic labor.

Because of technological development and the rise in wages, this is now by and large a thing of the past; but it is a reminder that large services sectors are not a new phenomenon as such. One could add to this that historically the work in the home, a traditional burden for women, has never been paid at all insofar as done by the (female) members of the household themselves – yet if it had been, this would have meant in statistical terms a vast expansion of the actual ‘services sector’ in proportion to the total economy. In other cases, there is no clarity why one thing counts as industrial production and the other as a service, as in the attempts of the fast food industry to have the production and sale of hamburgers and fries relabelled as manufacturing. After all, why does working up raw materials into a finished commodity for sale count as industrial production if it happens in a factory, but not if it happens in a kitchen? And what if someone cleans and maintains the factory space, so it remains a safe and productive environment for the use of the machinery – is that services or part of production? Ultimately this particular distinction is not so important or meaningful.

A second major objection against this idea is the simple fact that anything whatever that is processed, transported, packaged, rented, sold, or speculated on must first be produced. Every single good that is used in the so-called ‘knowledge economy’ still has been made somewhere, by means of old-fashioned industrial processes. However, the elephant in the room is that this production has by and large been moved to Third World countries. Of course, the West does have some high value industry, in particular in branches where the standard production requires high enough levels of technology to justify the high wages of the workers. Nonetheless, the historical shift to a ‘services sector’ is in reality more like a historical shift of production to China, India, the Philippines, Taiwan and so forth. While we pretend here that producing stuff is a funny and outdated concept, eight year old girls manufacture our jeans and cellphones in Manila or Phnom Penh.

In the context of the ‘knowledge economy’ it is worth noting that in such countries this shift to industrial production domestically tends to come either at the expense of education or in places where education has never been within reach of the masses – for example because liberalization has made it unaffordable for them, or because the move to the cities due to domestic uneven development forces individuals into a day by day struggle for bare survival. Countries like the Netherlands also treat highly educated foreign migrants from such countries appallingly badly, so the Iraqi refugee who is a qualified doctor will be lucky if he can get a job as a cleaner in a hospital. For this reason our ‘knowledge economy’ is not just based on unequal exchange (another subject entirely), but also on the brain drain from developing countries, whose brains we do not even know to value properly. The effect of large-scale industrial production on the intellectual and creative powers of the workers of those Third World countries is in the meantime well known. One need but quote the great liberal theorist Adam Smith, who famously wrote in the language of his time:

The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects are perhaps always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life.

(1)

The ‘knowledge economy’ as instrument of social mobility

Of course, one could argue this takes the meaning of ‘knowledge economy’ simply too narrowly. Maybe it just means the need for more education, for example sending more kids to college, so that in our high-tech societies we can enable (or maintain) social mobility. After all, is it not true that now everything is run by computers and natural sciences and engineering knowledge are more needed than ever, we need to be able to produce more and more highly qualified people? Is this not essential to keep our wages high, to prevent people getting stuck in low-paid jobs, and to maintain our productivity? Of course this is not entirely untrue, and it would be senseless to wholly deny this. But the value of education and investment therein for reducing inequality is not nearly as great as the liberal parties – fearful as they are of any serious disruption of the structure of private property – make it appear.

Firstly, it is sadly the case that inequality and poverty affect the results and potentials of education from the get-go. There exists by now a plethora of social and natural scientific research into the effects of poverty on schooling, and the results show again and again that poverty literally acts as a poison: as much as it reduces opportunities socially, it also damages the brain physically. In the newsletter of the Harvard Neuroscience Institute we can, for example, find the following:

Significant and continuing stress can have a negative impact on early brain development. The day-to-day adversity of severe poverty and parental mental health problems such as maternal depression, which has a higher prevalence among poor women, can compromise parent-child interaction. (…) Unrelenting stress in the absence of supportive relationships with adults—referred to as “toxic stress”—causes a prolonged activation of the body’s stress response system, which includes the release of stress hormones such as cortisol. Released by the adrenal gland, cortisol circulates in the brain during the body’s fight-or-flight response to stress. Under normal circumstances, cortisol has short-term benefits that help protect us from danger. When the cortisol system is repeatedly activated, however, levels of cortisol remain high and can actually damage the brain.

(2)

Maybe this seems remote from the subject of the ‘knowledge economy’, but it is not. It leads to the important conclusion that the intellectual and educational potential of children is already affected by inequality and poverty before the educational institutions properly have their effect, and therefore regardless of the nature and quality of those educational institutions. Now a second point is that the much vaunted ability of higher education to provide for higher wages, and thereby to function as a lever for increasing social mobility, contains a category mistake. It is well known from economic statistics that someone with a Bachelor’s degree from a good college will have a higher lifetime earning potential on average than someone with a degree of vocational schooling, and that person more than a high school dropout, and so forth (this is even true for much derided degrees like English or Philosophy). It seems therefore obvious to want as many people to go to college as possible. The problem is however that what goes for the individual does not necessarily go for the collective. The wage advantage of higher education is a relative advantage: the degree is only valuable when most people do not possess one. When it becomes commonplace to obtain a certain level of schooling, the wage advantage disappears. This development is already visible in most Western societies: since the massive increase in university students in the 1960s and 1970s, it is already no longer the case that a simple Bachelor’s degree equivalent is sufficient for a well-paid job. For jobs that previously only required some higher quality high school education, one may now well need a Master’s degree; and for jobs that previously required basic university schooling, one now requires a PhD at the minimum. In short, possession of higher education degrees is a zero sum game: an advantage for one is a disadvantage for the other, and it is impossible for all to receive this advantage.

This is simple to explain by observing that Western economies, like all capitalist economies, necessarily have a limited proportion of ‘good jobs’. One might consider a ‘good job’ one that pays well, allows for a certain degree of creativity at work, and one that carries a certain social prestige. A given economy unfortunately simply requires a certain number of socially necessary tasks of production, from cleaning to agriculture and from industrial production to transport. Some of these can be outsourced to China, but not all – the ‘services sector’ then seems more than anything else to mean that part of the economy which cannot easily be outsourced. At the same time, there is necessarily a limited number of jobs with a relatively high wage and with social prestige, precisely because both of these are relative terms, and therefore once more a zero sum game. As John Marsh summarizes in his worthwhile book Class Dismissed:

Regardless of how much use the poor make of their right to a good education, there are not enough decent and remunerative jobs — there are not even enough indecent and low-paying jobs — to go around. The number of heads of households living in poverty outnumbers the supply of job openings that would lift their holders and their families above the poverty threshold.

(3)

This is not something inherent to labor. It is something inherent to labor which is distributed according to a competitive labor market. If there are suddenly many more professors for the same amount of academic work, their wages and their social prestige will inevitably decline over time. The same goes for doctors, engineers, lawyers, and so forth. (There are also major gender aspects to this, but I ignore these for the sake of the argument.) Simultaneously it is impossible to replace indefinitely the labor needs of industry, agriculture, transport etc. with mechanization and technology, without this greatly increasing the wages of the remaining employees in a given branch in relative terms (which in Western Europe produces the phenomenon of the ‘Polish plumber’). This means in its totality that there is an endless shifting around of ‘good jobs’, and a constant change in the formal educational requirements of different branches of the economy; but the number of ‘good jobs’ does not proportionally increase over time.

This makes the accumulation of qualifications and degrees in the hope of providing everyone with a ‘good job’ a hopeless endeavour. ‘Good jobs’ now require many diplomas because many people can now competitively pursue them and there are few such jobs, not because diplomas generate ‘good jobs’. Even as late as the First World War, most doctors and lawyers in the United States did not need any formal qualifications at all, as few people had any higher education and therefore it was redundant as a relative demand for the purposes of competition. Now, things are different. In fact, much of the inequality in Western society is inequality within the population with higher education, not just between the higher and lower educated. This form of inequality is at best unaffected, and perhaps even negatively affected by the proposals about more investment in college educations for all. So to sum up, pursuing a ‘knowledge economy’ in which everyone can use higher education to gain the advantages that are by definition relative and zero-sum is like the desperate attempt of a dog to bite its own tail.

Knowledge as an end, not a means

Does this then mean that desiring a highly educated people is all nonsense? Not quite. What all the chatter about the ‘knowledge economy’ does not mention is the one real advantage of higher education, the one that has nothing to do with competition or the economy in a narrow sense: intellectual improvement. A highly educated population is an engaged, critical population and one much better capable to realize their intellectual and creative potential, both within and without the sphere of work. Whether this involves composing music or designing inventions, writing novels or critical analyses of the political system, it is very hard for any of these to be within the reach of the masses without higher education being common. Reducing this to a term like ‘human capital’, as is done in the economic theories consciously or unconsciously relied upon by the pedlars of the ‘knowledge economy’, is doing the real purpose of society an injustice.

Our creative and intellectual capacities ought first and foremost to be in service to ourselves, als socially creative beings, not be subject to the vagaries of a labor market in which they are merely competitively counterposed to each other. This may sound utopian, but has nonetheless a very concrete character. The less time we have to spend in work to maintain ourselves, and the better and more fully educated we are, the better we are capable of creating, designing, thinking etc. all the beautiful things for ourselves and others that make life worthwhile. It also means we have more time for each other. This is a matter of thinking differently about the value of competition, of work-time and non-work-time, and about the application of technology to these ends. A ‘knowledge economy’ is putting the cart before the horse.

1) Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book V, Chapter I, Part III, Article II.
2) http://www.hms.harvard.edu/hmni/On_The_Brain/Volume15/HMS_OTB_Winter09_Vol15_No1.pdf
3) John Marsh, Class Dismissed: Why We Cannot Teach Or Learn Our Way Out Of Inequality. New York, NY (2011): Monthly Review Press, p. 177.

A Quick Note on the Assange Affair

After having been accused in Sweden of several counts of sexual assault, the editor of Wikileaks, Julian Assange, contested his extradition from the United Kingdom where he was residing. He lost his case in the trial court, in the High Court, and in the Supreme Court of England and Wales; but upon this decision, he fled into the London embassy of Ecuador, where he is now in hiding. The UK government has warned that embassies are not to be used for this purpose under the Vienna Convention, and threatens to remove him, while the Ecuadorian government (whose President, Correa, has been interviewed by Assange and knows him personally) accuses the British of imperialist threats. Behind all this is the spectre of the United States. It has not yet indicted Assange, but is plausibly suspected by many of seeking his extradition in turn in order to imprison or ‘disappear’ him, as has happened with Manning and other such cases. In other words, a perfect storm for the left.

A situation which would look very unfavorable for the imperialists, the initial blatant persecution of Wikileaks and its associates in order to cover up the ‘diplomacy’ that underwrites wars and tyrants everywhere, has turned into a source of acrimony and division among the left. In outline, a pro- and an anti-Assange camp has developed, and the situation is reaching levels of heated outrage about an individual that almost put to mind the days of Dreyfus. Contrary to that famous case, however, the individual in question does not come off so well. In order to shield the left from further division and from the strategic pitfalls confronting them, I think it is worthwhile to outline clearly my view on the Assange case, mindful of the fact that one can only judge individual cases to a limited extent and that doing so while events are ongoing can often appear foolish and unwise in retrospect. Continue reading “A Quick Note on the Assange Affair”

Book Review: Mary Gabriel, “Love and Capital: Karl and Jenny Marx and the Birth of a Revolution”

The genre of the personal biography, when applied to famous historical figures, more often than not falls in the traps of sensationalism, moralism, or hagiography. This is not least the case when it comes to persons of considerable political controversy, such as Karl Marx and his friends and family. However, Mary Gabriel’s personal biography of the Marx-Engels clan studiously and brilliantly avoids all cliches and all sensationalism, portraying the characters ‘warts and all’, sympathetically but without making saints of them. Its almost 600 pages are unflaggingly interesting, intelligent, and informative even to those who are very well acquainted with Marxism’s theory and the chronology of its origins. But what’s more important is that it is virtually unique in its emphasis on the personal life of Karl and Jenny Marx, their children, their friends (not least of course Engels), and their many associates.

Although Gabriel makes sure to make clear the significance and substance of the various works Marx, Engels, and the family wrote or worked on during their life, this is not yet another political-romantic biography of the theoretical heroes of socialism. On the contrary, this book is a chronicle of their private hopes and pleasures, their struggles, and their difficulties. Also uncharacteristic for the many biographers of the Marx-Engels extended family is Gabriel’s courageous and timely decision to emphasize the significance of the lives and work of the women of the group: Jenny Marx, Karl’s wife; their three daughters, their only children to survive infancy; Freddy Demuth, the illegitimate son of Karl Marx; and the daughters’ partners, children, and friends. In the usual biographies of Marx and/or Engels, his wife appears merely in the background and his daughters are a footnote, but in Gabriel’s biography, they come into their own as serious and dedicated revolutionary thinkers and doers in their own right. In the process Mary Gabriel finally also clears up a number of small errors and confusions that have been copied from one biography to another, and she is to be commended for the great thoroughness with which she has conducted and presented her research on a topic many would think has been too fully mined to lead to any new gold.

In an era when both Marxism and the cause of women’s equality seem more under attack than ever before, and yet are more needed than ever, it is fitting and just that a great new biography should revive the founders of Marxism as human beings in all their glories and failings, and that for the first time the women in the family should play an equal role in the narrative. While the political and theoretical histories of Marx and Engels’ lives tend to be a story of triumph against adversity, Gabriel’s book makes it clear that this cannot by any means be said of the private lives of the family. More than anything else, it stands out clearly for the first time what a sad, difficult, and often despairing life they led, the women of the family especially. It has often been remarked on, but it only becomes clear from this work why the Marx women all died early, several to suicide; and it is clear that their lives were not as happy or as fulfilling of their own great talents, no less than those of the men, as they should have been.

Two great forces of their age made their lives more confined and more frustrated in its potential than anyone ought to accept of any society: on the one hand, Victorian moralism and the enduring power of patriarchal values; on the other hand, the more physical but no less destructive power of disease. The former held the women in restricted positions, endlessly sacrificing their wishes, their talents, and their very happiness to the cause of the men; the latter robbed them – the men no less than the women – of their strengths, energy, and future. In Gabriel’s book, there is rarely a moment that some member of the great Marxist family is not gravely ill. Many of Marx’s children as well as of his grandchildren died in childhood of vague diseases, caused by the poverty and inequality of their times, and incurable by the low level of medical expertise and the difficulty of affording it. In a time when both these great hostile forces, patriarchy and disease, are the prime enemies of the emancipation of humanity in most of the world, it is a sad but useful reminder of their impact to read how they destroyed the Marx family. Marx himself may well have lived longer and been much more productive, to the lasting benefit of our knowledge of socialism, had he not been perpetually ill and taken such medication as mercury and arsenic, never mind much alcohol, to alleviate it.

Love and Capital is therefore not necessarily a happy read. But it is a fascinating read, full of lively detail, engaging writing, and sound judgements. It does without the hypocrisy or moralism of many hostile biographers but also free of the pretense that the Marx family was flawless in their personal life. The author also does not shy away from the real revolutionary commitment of all the participants, not just Marx and Engels but their wives, Marx’s children and husbands also, and does not try to reinvent them as ‘democratic’ egghead theorists or irrelevant Victorian ranters. If one has to have an objection, it is some very minor errors and that the copious endnote apparatus often contains no further explanation of the many interesting and illuminating details first mentioned in the text. But those are just quibbles. On the whole, this book by a respected Reuters editor (of all people) is of enormous benefit to our understanding of the historical reality of the founding family of Marxism, and in particular of the real contribution of Marx’s wife and daughters to setting this great movement of history in motion. It deserves to be widely read and will surely become a classic in the history of Marxism.

Steve Keen’s Critique of Marx’s Theory of Value: A Rejoinder

After a long period of being virtually a lone voice in the non-Marxist wilderness railing against neoclassical economics, its structure, assumptions, and ideas, Professor Steve Keen appears to finally be heard. The current crisis has dented much of public and scientific confidence alike in economic orthodoxy (as it should). Nothing illustrates this better perhaps than the story of the British Queen, Elizabeth II, writing to the colleagues of the London School of Economics and asking them the pointed question: how did you not see this coming, and if you could not, what are you being paid for? This is perhaps somewhat unfair, as the specifics of any particular crisis depend on many specific and contingent factors that the more general and imprecise nature of neoclassical (macro-)economics is barely equipped to address, and few other theories fare that much better. But Keen has rightly pointed out that he did predict this crisis, and also in its form as the collapse of a speculative bubble in real estate and finance, as he did in the previous edition of his excellent best-selling critique of political economy, Debunking Economics. This Cassandra position, now perhaps turned into one more akin to Tiresias, has given him occasion to publish a new and expanded version of this book – one I recommend all readers to buy for its excellent and systematic critiques of the inconsistency of much of the neoclassical framework beyond the sphere of mere applied mathematics.(1)

However, this is not to say one should not also examine Keen’s work itself with a critical eye. As a supporter of the contemporary (neo-)Marxist theories of economics, and since this blog has the purpose, among other things, of promoting a Marxist outlook on politics and economics suitable for contemporary conditions, it is a serious fact that in the book mentioned above Professor Keen rather sharply dismisses the contribution of Marxist economics to understanding modern political economy. (He explicitly subtitles a paragraph: “Why most Marxists are irrelevant, while most of Marx is not”).(2) While he seems inclined to rhetorically praise Marx, he quite explicitly dismisses Marx’s economic theories as inferior to his own approach, which appears based on an understanding largely derived from Piero Sraffa. To go into the specifics of Sraffianism, post-Keynesianism and so forth would require a lengthy narration of the history of economic thought, one that would interest few people. More to the point, the average intelligent layman reading Keen’s book will want to know: who is right? And quite justly so. Now in chapter 17 of his book, Professor Keen provides, after a brief overview of classical economics, essentially three arguments against what he takes as Marx’s theory of value (often called the “labor theory of value”). Therefore, I shall endeavour to rejoin these arguments Keen advances against Marx’s theory of value in due order. –I must warn the reader that this will contain a considerable amount of complex and very abstract discussion, based on Marx’s conceptual understanding and terminology as applied to his pure theory of capitalism. Although I have endeavoured to write it so it is maximally understandable for people not much used to Marx’s terms and way of thinking, one may find it boring and confusing, as I cannot summarize the entirety of his theory as well as address Professor Keen’s critiques. Therefore, one may want to skip this article, or focus only on the sections dealing with the implications of all this theorizing.– Continue reading “Steve Keen’s Critique of Marx’s Theory of Value: A Rejoinder”

Book Review: István Mészáros, “The Challenge and Burden of Historical Time”

If Hungarian Marxist philosopher Istvan Meszaros is indeed Hugo Chavez’s favorite theorist, as implied by the book cover, the President of Venezuela must be a patient man indeed. The Challenge and Burden of Historical Time appears to present Meszaros’ philosophy of history, and because of the high regard he is held in by many (as shown also by the enthusiastic introduction from John Bellamy Foster), this seems promising enough. But in reality, the book is a mere collection of essays, articles, and occasional pieces, by and large on the same topic. As a result, the argument, the content and even the quotations are extremely repetitive, an effect which is worsened by Meszaros’ ineptly abstract, obscurantist writing style. When all is said and done, The Challenge and Burden of Historical Time introduces few new ideas to the body of socialist theorizing about the historical course of capitalism and the transition to socialism. Continue reading “Book Review: István Mészáros, “The Challenge and Burden of Historical Time””