The Red and the Green I: Capitalism and Ecology

It is, or ought to be, by now a familiar fact that the world is in a state of great environmental crisis. While there is no need to believe in the myth of the perfectly virtuous native living in complete harmony with his environment, it is clear that the development of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution so-called have drastically and fundamentally altered the relationship of man to his biosphere. In fact, so much so that it is estimated this century may see the greatest single increase in man-made global warming in all of the memory of humanity as a species, as a result of processes begun only two centuries ago at most. Our impact upon the global network of ecosystems is now so great that the current period of civilization is now by biologists considered to be a Great Extinction Event, one of the very few in our planet’s entire history – the last one took place approximately 65 million years ago. Moreover, the current Extinction Event is also the fastest ever recorded. A consensus predicts a future scenario in which between 20% and 50% of all species on Earth may go extinct.1 Continue reading “The Red and the Green I: Capitalism and Ecology”

Herr David Irving’s Umwalzung der Geschichte

Although David Irving possesses no formal qualifications, he nonetheless has a certain reputation as a British historian of WWII and its background, much in the same sense in which the mafia can be said to have a reputation. On the basis of his earlier denial of the reality of the Shoah, the government of Austria convicted him, since this historical position is a crime in that republic when publicly avowed. This was not only politically wrong but also a strategic error, as it allowed Irving to play the martyred historian, all the more since he puts enormous efforts into presenting himself as a ‘respectable’ conservative Briton of the old school, rather than as an anti-semitic fascist and ultrareactionary, which his opponents accuse him of being. In order to justify himself after his stint in an Austrian prison, he wrote a publicly available essay-cum-memoir on the topic. Analysis of this will prove highly fruitful in order to understand how narrow and sometimes practically invisible the line is between ‘respectable conservatism’ and outright fascist tendencies. The text involved is titled Banged Up: Surviving as a Political Prisoner in 21st Century Europe. As we shall see, although he may lack historical sense, one thing Irving has a surfeit of is self-pity and pathos, and the title is just the beginning. (For those who wish to read along, it can be freely found at http://www.fpp.co.uk/books/Banged/up.pdf .)

After a romantic introduction to the horrors of war, which Irving seems to have mostly boyish fantasies about based on his boyhood memories, we are easily led to believe that here is a man who has never fully grown up, and sees war as an adventure. As we shall see, little he says later on will dispel this notion. All the more since he feels the need to emphasize his cavalier attitude toward women and to boast about his expensive car, sure signs of the mental maturity of a 14 year old. He gets to the point soon enough though – his arrival in Austria, invited by the Olympia Bursenschaft. Of course, he does not see the need to inform us of the justified reputation of right-wing elitism prevalent among the Bursenschaften, whose traditions of ‘patriotism’, duelling, casual anti-semitism and so forth remind us more of 1815 than of 2009.

Moreover, he realizes that the invitation does not imply that he is actually welcome from the point of view of the government, as shown by his manner of entry into the country: “In a Swiss rental car I drove east all night through Zürich and into Austria. I had decided not to risk fying direct to Vienna. Many countries in western Europe are police states now, with state police—Staatspolizei, which operate broadly like the Gestapo with which we historians are familiar.” Yes, pathetic as this sounds, the minor political repression exercised by various post-fascist nations on the continent is considered by this eminent historian to be wholly equivalent to the Gestapo. This does not, of course, reflect in any way on his capacity to make proper historical judgements on WWII or reveal his sense of proportion, or lack thereof. Irving is an honorable man.

He continues to describe his rather clandestine meeting with a representative of Olympia, which has to take place as undercover as possible since both of them are aware that the Austrian secret police will be on their trail. This also offers him the opportunity to comment on his problematic prior visit to the country: “Still half suspecting that the function might not take place, I asked him to grab a snapshot under the Landtmann’s canopy as proof that I was in Vienna. It would certainly irritate some folks back in London. The Board of Deputies of British Jews had written in June 1992 to the Austrian government, livid at hearing of a recent visit by me to the country, and demanding my immediate arrest the next time. Some “Britons”!“. As the reader will see, this will not be his last comment on the apparently rather dubious national status of Jews in this article, which he sees fit to bring up fairly regularly, whether relevant for his train of thought or not. Of course, this by no means implies he believes in retrograde 19th Century conspiracy theories. Irving is an honorable man. Especially when he then adds, in case the point was not clear enough: “Strange, the things that turn out to have been going on all along un-seen, unheard—like the termites gnawing at the woodwork of a rotten building. Not that they are an International Conspiracy of course, they have always denied that.” It is well known of course that respectable conservative historians normally compare ethnic groups to termites and other insects. It truly takes a rabid nutcase to see anything fascist in this. Irving is an honorable man.

Later, it transpires that before the meeting can take place, the Staatspolizei is already on their trail. After posturing in front of a statue of Goethe, our intrepid hero flees in a car toward the border, only to be apprehended before reaching it. Subsequently, he is charged under the Wiederbetätigung laws, that is, the legal mechanism to suppress attempts to revive fascism. Although Austria has never been properly denazified, these laws have been created and remain still, an attempt (however futile the means) to create a bulwark against fascism in a country where it was at its most popular. Irving, of course, makes of this: “Since there is little prospect of a Nazi movement re-emerging now, it is widely used to harass political opponents.” There is some truth to this, but those ‘political opponents’ are without exception those associated with the extreme right nonetheless, whether or not they truly pose a danger. After all, it would be hard to convict the KPÖ of trying to revive Nazism. But our historian does not see the need to reflect on this, or why he is a ‘political opponent’.

In jail, he describes one of a series of worrying events that take place throughout the whole affair: events that indicate his popularity. Irving is of course wholly unreliable when it comes to himself, since his self-perception is supported by little other than his juvenile romanticism of the Persecuted Tell-it-like-it-is Decent Conservative, but knowing Austrian politics there may well be reason to believe that his stories are not entirely made up. So when he begins his term in jail awaiting trial, and tells us that “On the second or third day several offcers knocked on my cell door (yes, they knocked on a cell door), unlocked it, and brought in my books from their homes for me to autograph“, there is probably little reason to doubt it. Clearly in Austria there are many traces and remnants still of the old order, and the consequences of its denazification not having been seriously carried out can be seen. He then complains: “The justice system was less accommodating. My requests to speak to a lawyer or to Bente in London were fruitless. Six weeks or more would pass before I could phone my family from Vienna. The illegality of this was obvious.” The Gestapo of course would have let him phone much sooner. He then has the gall to make the following comparison, since he has not sufficiently, according to his own lights, shoveled the Nazi comparisons onto the compost heap of his self-pity: “I remained philosophical. It was much harder on Bente. In London,they feared I was dead; when I did not return from Vienna on time, sheand her friends phoned the embassies, the police, the hospitals, the mortuaries, the car hire firms; but nobody knew what had happened to me. Unable to contact me to access bank accounts or use key system-passwords, she lost our home and possessions. Nacht und Nebel was the system, as invented by Reinhard Heydrich and his police. One vanished, as though in Night and Fog.” Yes. Truly, according to our respected and serious historian of WWII, sitting a few weeks in pre-trial arrest in Jakomini is equivalent to Nacht und Nebel, with all that implies. Of course, this should not lead us to declare him insane, hysterical, or wholly unfit for any historical judgement. Irving is an honorable man. And “philosophical” at that.

Irving then tells us about his reading materials, which the new Gestapo apparently gladly provided to him, which unsurprisingly are stolid British works of slight antiquity and requiring little imagination: Sherlock Holmes, P.G. Wodehouse, the Hornblower novels. More interesting is his commentary on the prevalence of suicide among the prisoners in his jail. Although we may well assume that he emphasizes this in order to underline the horrors his victimized innocence has had to endure, it is likely a reflection of reality, and moreover shows that when he really desires, he can show some real empathy. It is all the more unfortunate that this has been warped by his descent into the swamp of ‘historical revisionism’.

He then describes the visit of the British consul representative, and asks her to send a coded message, “COPENHAGEN”, to his girlfriend Bente Høgh. As he explains: “Copenhagen was the codeword we had arranged; Bente was to watch for it. However it was used—if I said it to a journalist, or on TV, or on a postcard message, it meant I had been arrested and was unable to contact her, and she was to take certain steps. Just like the BBC’s “Verlaine” messages to the French Resistance before the Normandy landings.” Our pseudo-academic hero obviously misses no opportunity for WWII comparisons. Indeed, an unfriendly commentator might suggest a slight obsession with the topic. This is not of itself all that remarkable, as there are probably more amateur historians and devotees of WWII history than of all other subjects combined (except in the United States, where their Civil War plays this role); what is more intriguing are the analogies he makes. Desiring both to produce apologetics for the actual fascists as well as to be a ‘decent conservative’, he veers back and forth between comparing himself to the Allies and to the victims of Nazi persecution, but those analogies do not really seem to sit well with him, because he sticks to none of them. This is also seen a few paragraphs farther in his tale, when he describes his preparedness to expect the worst (i.e. arrest) when visiting other countries. He produces the following gem of a historical parallel: “In fact I was always steeled for the worst: I was a Boy Scout in my youth, and be prepared was on our belt-buckle, just as some Germans, including Günter Grass as it now turns out, had Meine Ehre Heisst Treue embossed on theirs.” This indeed summarizes well the viewpoint of our historical protagonist. On the one hand Boy Scout, on the other hand the Waffen-SS, and incapable of seeing the difference. Not that we would accuse him of making a bagatelle out of that deadly organization: Irving is an honorable man.

David Irving is then sent to the main jail in Vienna in a “Krokodil”, a particular transport vehicle apparently used by Austrian justice for prisoner transports, and which Irving emphasizes as being unsafe and illegal elsewhere, as he also does with the prison itself at Josefstadt where he is brought. Irving’s text provides us with some intriguing information on the average continental prison system from the inside, written by a clearly intelligent commentator, and this is something worthwhile about it. However, the intellectual price paid for access to this is too high. In any case, Irving is brought to trial before Mr. Justice Seda, whom he mocks as having a high voice. Our respected historian, as we will see more often, is not above a few ad hominems of a rather simplistic kind when it suits him: another sign of his maturity seemingly having ceased around the time when Irving himself stopped having a high voice. Perhaps that is why he makes such a point of it. More worryingly and relevantly, we get in this jail also a description of his apparent popularity with the rank-and-file: “As word spread round the Josefstadt jail on who I was, I received a stream of uniformed, if not always offcial, visitors. Jailers brought me packets of good-quality coffee or gifts. At Christmas, one offcer unlocked my cell, invited me to his room, and offered me a glass of whisky—“This remains strictly between us, Mr. Irving.”” Aside from Irving’s word apparently not quite being his bond, despite his claims to the Boy Scout ideals, one can wonder what kind of society has jailers encouraging visits and gifts, “not quite officially”, to people accused of reviving Nazism. Not that Irving would be guilty of such an inclination – Irving is an honorable man.

En passant, he remarks upon the efforts apparently on the part of the Austrian Ministry of Justice to get his books removed from the library prisons, of itself well enough – although there is little point in banning Irving’s works, this does not oblige a government to make them freely available to wards of the state, especially if they are to be rehabilitated in a manner so that they can improve society in the future. Irving sneers that the press reported the books would be burned, which according to him proves the provenance of Austria as a Nazi state. It’s hard to tell whether that is true, but if so, it was a silly move. Sillier however is Irving not realizing that if Austria were really a Nazi state now, this is precisely what would explain his warm reception among the prison visitors and guards! Subsequently, Irving discusses his lawyers for the trial. He desires to pick Herbert Schaller, whom he at different points describes as a defender of free speech, a ‘patriot’, and so forth. Such compliments coming from our historical friend are indeed more damning than many an insult, and it may be no surprise then that Dr. Jur. Schaller himself has been repeatedly accused of Holocaust denial, including denial of the existence of gas chambers, and so forth, and that he has also attended the infamous conference organized in Teheran on ‘Holocaust denial’, intended a publicity stunt against Israel on the part of Iran’s government. Not, of course, that Irving sees the need to inform the reader of any of this, although surely if it is so legitimate and above-board, this should not reflect poorly on Schaller or himself? In any case, he decides eventually not to pick Schaller, but takes on an attention-hungry fool named Kresbach instead, who is obviously out to use Irving’s case for propagating his own renown. Our intrepid historian realizes this too late, and is stuck with him for the trial. In between commenting on these affairs, he also presents a vignette (the text is filled with various vignettes showing off either his books or himself in various poses and with various decors), showing: “The Unmentionable: My book on the 1956 Hungarian Uprising mentions that most of the secret police and their Communist bosses were Jews.” A legitimate and totally relevant fact for historical research of course, which David Irving has justly taken much effort to present to the world. Only a truly uncharitable spectator could see anything suspicious in this. Irving is an honorable man.

The trial itself, both because Irving was clearly guilty of what he was accused of (that is, having on Austrian soil denied the Shoah in its full extent), and because of his lawyer’s incompetence and guilty plea, is a disaster for Irving. He does however gloat about the favorable media reception, at least as he sees it: “The Italian newspapers, particularly Silvio Berlusconi’s, went overboard with their contempt of Austria, and I saw newspaper photographs of one major championship football match in northern Italy at which a section of the crowd unfurled a banner reading IRVING LIBERO for the television cameras.” This tells us many things: first, it tells us quite a lot about the ‘respectability’ of Berlusconi’s government; second, it tells us much about Irving’s common sense in judgement, since he apparently is not very aware of the political leanings of many Italian football fans (one is tempted to think the team involved could be Juventus or Hellas Verona or a similar one with a history of fascism); third, it tells us that despite the Gestapo nature of his prison, he apparently had no trouble getting access to even international newspapers. One thing it does not tell us though, and that is what Irving thinks it tells us, namely the legitimacy of his cause. All the more when he then continues with: “Der Spiegel ran a fine five-page article which attracted angry letters from my opponents, including Hungarian writer Paul Lendvai, who snarled that my book Uprising was anti-Semitic (my book mentioned that all the Hungarian communist monsters like Kun, Revai, Farkas, Gerö, and Rakösi were Jewish; as is Lendvai himself).” Truly the “snarling” Lendvai must be absolutely hysterically deluded to see any anti-semitism in Irving’s research into an important and relevant topic as whether various randomly selected Communist “monsters” were also all Jews. Irving is an honorable man.

Well, back to his prison, since Irving had no chance of winning the trial, and didn’t. In the prison he helpfully informs us of the demographics present: “Once I was shown into the holding tank, and it contained only fifteen very disgruntled Blacks (twenty-five percent of the prisoners were from Africa, nearly all for drug dealing, some for murder or rape).” Fortunately, the Blacks, capital letter and all (is there anyone who does not faintly hear an Afrikaner accent in his mind when reading this?), have a refined sense of humor and appreciate Irving’s Etonian jokes: “I hesitated as the steel door behind me slammed shut, and said: “Sorry, I think there’s been a mistake. Where’s the waiting room for Whites?” They bellowed with laughter. It’s the kind of joke that needs split-second timing, and one that you can only risk in certain circumstances.” Those circumstances presumably do not include any situation in which people with a less subtle sense of humor are present, or things might end grimly for our respected would-be academic some day. After some complaints about the “jungle” in the prison, what with all the African languages spoken, Irving continues with explaining the nature of his complaint. He is given the files proving he had denied the Holocaust on Austrian soil. It is telling, according to our protagonist, that the complaint came from the Document Centre for the Austrian Resistance, which, he hastens to tell us, is “a well-known Jewish and Communist-front organisation”. Sic. To add to the ignominy of being accused by such lowlifes as the Jews and Communists of the Austrian resistance archives, he is also condemned by the leading Austrian historian Erika Weinzierl. Since she is not Jewish, Irving has to go for the second-best option for any ‘respectable’ British public school boy: misogyny. He makes much hay out of finding different ‘subtle’ ways to describe her lack of good looks, which apparently according to his historiographical expertise is of great importance to judge the truth of someone’s statements. Once is inclined to comment that this would not do his own case that much good either, however.

The trial itself is in his description of little interest – as mentioned, he could not win, his lawyer was incompetent, and most of the description consists of Irving’s repeated complaints about how those crazy Austrians have the gall to have different customs than back home in Britain. The whole affair exudes a highly suffocating Little Englanderism, emphasizing the parochial pettiness of Irving’s neuroses. The same is shown by his petty attempts at playing to the crowd, as when he makes a big deal out of always having a pen and book with him when entering the courtroom, to underline apparently that he is a writer, in other words, murdered innocence. I doubt that anyone saw this press stunt for anything else than what it was, but Irving’s Little England cleverness always thinks that it can fool any foreigners. To finish it off, the Austrian jury turns out to be mostly women, who also do not happen to meet our protagonist’s exacting aesthetic standards, and therefore can be up to no good. One gets the impression that Irving’s view of women relies on a tradition virtually unchanged since the days of St. Paul. What’s more, Irving’s tendency to judge his antagonists by their physical appearance also leads him to consistently insinuate Nazism on their part by means of physical analogy: the prosecutor, Klackl, reminds him of the sinister Jew Aronsfeld, or “even more oddly of Adolf Eichmann, on trial in Jerusalem at that same time.” His own lawyer’s incompetence, of course, makes him equivalent to the July Coup conspirators of 1944, even though Irving chose him himself: “I found myself recalling the Berlin People’s Court after the July 20, 1944 Bomb Plot, where one defence lawyer began his opening submission with the words, “Having listened to the opening remarks of my colleague the Public Prosecutor about the disgraceful behaviour of my client, I find that I can only wholeheartedly endorse them. . .”” With this quality of ‘recalling’, it is no surprise Irving’s approach to historiography has not met with much acclaim amongst his peers. Of the judge he writes: “All the while the Judge sat on his high podium, pink cheeked and puffy faced, oddly reminiscent of Mr Justice Gray in the Lipstadt libel trial.” There is of course nothing neurotically juvenile about calling your opponents ugly and therefore wrong, or about seeing conspiratorial parallels between one’s supposed persecutors – Irving is an honorable man.

Eventually he is convicted, and although according to his own claims receiving many letters in support and only one hostile one (which sounds unlikely), he is remitted to jail, of course awaiting appeal. Again he notes how he attempts to stay sane in jail by seeing his jail as a friendly place, shielding him from unwanted outside intrusions, but also remarks upon the many suicides that seem to take place in the prison, although prison authorities attempt to hide it. As a prison writer, Irving could do worse. Would that one could say the same of him as a historian. In jail he reads the documents relating to his conviction, and angrily remarks that the judge has tried informing himself on the person of Irving on his own before the trial, which apparently is highly offensive to his British judicial sensibilities. Worse is the fact that he read in the Süddeutsche Zeitung an article described by Irving as “a raving article by Eva Menasse, a young Jewish jour-
nalist.” Although he claims to have liked her before when meeting her, something which apparently did not prevent him from making a point of her Jewishness, now her articles praising his conviction are “suspiciously well-informed”. It is difficult to see what this means, other than that apparently reading up on Austrian constitutional law is part of a greater conspiracy by unnamed, but presumably Jewish, elements. More laments about the press follow, and some attempts to ingratiate himself with the reader by describing his happy family life and how he misses his poor children, while commenting along the way about the unpleasant “Romany laments” of a “gypsy out of the window”. He also is visited by a certain Brigitte Müller, whom he seems to have cheated on his wife with (or at least he hints as much), but this does not seem to diminish his perception of himself as a happy family man of honesty and ‘respectability’. He is also visited by a Hungarian woman named Réka, who seems to be a fan of his political-historical works and finally does pass his aesthetic tests that all women are to be judged by. Given the recent success of the ultrareactionary Jobbik party in Hungary, and the general worryingly fascist trend in Eastern European politics, this unfortunately comes as no surprise. Despite the Gestapo-like, Nacht und Nebel-nature of his evil Nazi jailers, he is quite capable of even holding long-distance interviews with the BBC. Herein he manages to present the death march from Auschwitz, which killed many of the prisoners who had survived the operation of that cursed institution itself, and the abandoning of the sick prisoners to whatever slow decrepit death presumably faced them, in the following way: “ the clear evidence that even when the Auschwitz site was about to be overrun in January 1945 the Nazis either evacuated the 70,000 Jews still there to the west (including Anne Frank) or left those who so chose (including Anne’s sick father Otto) in the camp hospital being tended by SS doctors until the Russians came.” Evacuated! “Tended by SS doctors”! Contrast this with the description of the same events given in Elie Wiesel’s much-lauded memoir Night, in which his father dies with most of the other almost-survivors along the harrowing death trail from southern Poland to Germany, or with the description in Primo Levi’s The Reawakening of the abandonment of the sick prisoners (not a single “tending” SS-doctor in sight) to slow death by disease and hunger which was only ended by the final arrival of the liberating Soviet troops, and one can see well enough what kind of history-writing David Irving and his ‘revisionist’ colleagues are capable of. Not, of course, that these bald lies should be seen as apologetics for Nazism. David Irving is an honorable man.

Irving finally fires Kresbach and replaces him by Schaller, who is more of one mind with him (one wonders whether, when Irving says that “Nobody in their right mind can deny that the Nazis did kill millions of Jews”, he told his lawyer this too), and a “faithful soldier” besides, who “cuts a Churchillian figure in court” (the only points of comparison seem to be decrepit age and vile politics) and of course gets the obligatory physical comparison to a Nazi official: only this time, it is Erwin Rommel, which Irving clearly intends as great praise. Journalist Christa Zöchling writes a sarcastic article about Schaller, whom she cleverly calls a “Rechts-Anwalt” (the pun works only in German); as a result, Irving creepily inserts a vignette which shows her in a cafe reading a document, and describes her as a “flawed” journalist writing for Communist papers. These supposed insults are not very serious, but that the ‘respectable’ Irving apparently has people follow his antagonists around and take pictures of them unnoticed is a lot more worrying, and telling about the resemblance between his approach and those of Neonazis. After this, more descriptions of the life in jail follow, with some slightly amusing anecdotes about fellow prisoners and their cases, as well as the many ‘Blacks’ in the jail. He also notes the power of Austrian judges to effectively extort money from people who write critical articles about their judicial system, using the fact that slander is a penal crime in Austria (as in most countries based on the French legal system), and then suggesting out-of-court settlements. Again, Irving is not a reliable source on anything whatever, but it is an interesting observation if true. He also writes a letter to a certain Lady Renouf, which seems to have no content other than to show off he has friends among the nobility. This surely tells us more about British nobility than about him. More worrying is the vignette where he proudly presents his good relations and talks before the German military, the Bundeswehr. Knowing the problems with Neonazism in this institution, inviting Irving to hold talks is surely the last thing that ought to be on their mind. It is essential that the German public put pressure on their military to prevent a revival of right-wing militarism and revanchism of any kind. In the meantime, he writes on his biography of Himmler, whom he describes as “this strange character of Hitler’s Reich, who lived only forty-four years but achieved so much that was both grotesque and spectacular“, and loses a pen which Erhard Milch apparently had personally bequeathed to him. Friends in high places, indeed.

In the meantime his prison time slowly comes to an end. He takes the opportunity, when referring to Raul Hilberg, to usefully and informatively note that “there were only two Jews in this jail, on the foor above ours, C-2: one was made Blockschreiber, or block-clerk, although the jailers told me he could, or would, write only in Hebrew script; the other was allowed to keep his cell door permanently open on some pretext or other.” Never mind the unlikelihood of an Austrian Jew only writing in Hebrew, clearly the Jews “on some pretext or other” have managed to extend their termite-like powers to keeping doors open in Josefstadt prison. Surely this shows what virtually invincible forces our intrepid hero is up against. At least he has the grace to say that Hilberg “shared many of my views”, which is very appropriate since he then quotes an interview where Hilberg calls him a Hochstapler, meaning something like charlatan or fraud. A rare moment of honesty on Irving’s part! The objective reader will be glad he agrees. We can spare the reader summarizing the tale of the crook who in turn tries to defraud our charlatan himself, but more interesting is a supposed Sinti named “Gitan W.”, who tells Irving a tale of woe which mostly revolves around anti-gypsy sentiment among the Austrian government and judicial officials. Here Irving again shows he can have an empathetic side (if perhaps the empathy of one who thinks he knows ”one of the good ones” among the Jews or Communists or whatever), and there is little reason to doubt the truth of this Gitan W.’s story at least in this respect. Again, Irving’s tale gives us some material that is worthwhile, as long as Irving is not talking about his actual subject. Fortunately, our friend W. knows Irving well enough, and makes a point out of adding the important fact that ““The Judge was a Jewess,” he recalled, as an afterthought, and he gave me her name. “Sonja Allyes.”

After having compared himself with Imre Nagy (a rather odd comparison to say the least), Irving is then released after the appeal, his sentence having been commuted to time served, effectively. In between follows a diatribe about Israel in its fight against Lebanon, which shows the principle that a person can be right for the wrong reasons, and of course the obligatory comparison of his appeal trial judge to Martin Bormann. By now, this modus operandi becomes tiresomely familiar. Insert also a vignette about his friendly relations with Albert Speer – in fact, together with Joachim Fest, David Irving is highly responsible for the general view of Speer as a foolish artist caught up in Hitler’s web and quickly coming to resist him. This view is based entirely on the convenient fabrications of Speer himself and has no basis in reality, but Speer has enlisted the above historians quite effectively for his PR campaign. Gitta Sereny’s book on this topic, Speer und Er, gives more detail on this affair. In the meantime, Irving can go, according to him to the “bafflement of the Israelite Cultural Community and Leftist politicians at our appeal victory“. Of course, his imprisonment is all part of a greater whole, as he does not hesitate to tell us, and which apparently his Austrian guards wholeheartedly agree with, confirming the problems I alluded to above: “The officers accompanying me began cracking off-colour jokes, and two even began educating me about what they and everybody else knew: “You’ve been the victim of a small religious clique, a people not like us at all. They were the ones really behind your arrest in 2005.” I made no response.” Let us hope that this commentary was yet another “off-colour joke”, since Irving is so good at subtle humor. He is, after all, an honorable man. At least it turns out the stint in jail had some advantages, at least with regard to his weight: he happily tells us “I weighed in at 110 kilos, six less than when I was arrested in 2005, and height 186 cm; but for the weight and being English, I could have just made it into the Leibstandarte, Hitler’s Guards Brigade.

Our tale of torment is then practically over, with our hero finally freed from the shackles of his Jewish Nazi Communist oppressors, who do however use the opportunity to declare him non grata in Austria in the future. Too bad for the Bursenschaften, where now will they learn “what everyone knows” about who is behind the conspiracy of historians? Fortunately for them, Irving is always happy to inform them, be it in a veiled manner, of the real nature of the case: as he returns to London, speaking to a journalist, he “fed him the words: “Mel Gibson was right.”“. One is glad he tells us before this that he had “reset his mental dials to zero”, else one could be tempted to think ill of our ‘respectable’ conservative historian. Not that Irving is easily intimidated by the you-know-whos, of course. As he assures us, he has “not studied the life of Dr. Joseph Goebbels for nothing. It was one of his recommended techniques: Always counter-attack, but elsewhere.” The reader can be glad for this little insight into the sources of David Irving’s historiographical method. Truly a ‘Revolution in History’ from this honorable man.

Christianity and ‘Paganism’

The conversion of the ‘pagan’ countries to Christianity is an interesting question in the context of the current conflicts with regard to religion and religious conversions and their political dimensions. Despite the way it is often portrayed by Christian apologetics, there was nothing inevitable about the conversion process, nor was it necessarily a popular one. Much has been said about the conversion of ancient Rome to Christianity as a state religion, from Gibbon onward often seen as a contributor to its decline. Although this is said with dubious justification, yet the conversions of the early Middle Ages are somewhat under-considered. It is these to which we now turn.

Indeed even the conversion to Christianity of the Romans began at the top, with the fable of Constantine’s conversion after his victory over his opponent on the Pons Milvius, and this pattern is seen everywhere in the early Middle Ages. Missionaries sent by the Church would convert some King of a ‘barbarian’ people, and from that point on they are counted in the ranks of the Christians. However, this is clearly a tale all too simple, and it does not explain the motives involved. From a political point of view, the main questions are:
– Why was the focus of conversion at the top, not at the bottom, as seems to be the norm today in terms of missionary activity?
– What could have been the motives of the rulers to adopt Christianity rather than the extant religions?
– What might the response of the subjects of these rulers have been?
We will try to answer all of these questions.

First it is necessary to get an idea of what ‘the Church’ as such was and how it developed by means of some examples and chronology. Christianity had been a state religion, and the only permitted religion, in the Roman Empire from the time of Theodosius on, and in its proto-orthodox form (which refers to the variety of Christianity that later developed into Roman Catholicism as well as its offshoots in Protestantism and the Eastern Orthodox church). When the Roman Empire collapsed, the Byzantine successor empire in the east maintained Christianity, but in their own form, which over time increasingly diverged from that which was dominant in Western Europe. It must be noted, as an aside, that for most of the early Middle Ages Western Europe must be seen as, globally speaking, a fairly backward and provincial area, and certainly compared to the Byzantines despite their setbacks.

The most powerful church that developed under the first converted peoples was that of the Merovingian and Carolingian Franks, whose King Clovis I (466-511) converted to ‘Catholic’ Christianity around 500. (Some peoples, such as the Vandals, had been Christian already, but in the form of Arianism, which the church that operated in Rome and which carried the authority of the Roman ideology in the West did not accept.) The Frankish Kings from then on made a purposeful policy to ‘inherit’ the prestige as well as the administration, mutatis mutandis, of the Roman Empire, and since their realm was very large and relatively organized in the early Middle Ages, their political influence was great. It is through this that the ‘orthodox’, non-Arian form of Christianity came to dominate the continent, especially as it seems to have been more popular among the non-elites than the Arian form, even though it is now suspected Clovis had considered the merits of Arianism also.1 Through the power of the Frankish realm, Christianity spread to Kent, to Ireland, to parts of Germany, Scandinavia, and Spain, all of whom had fairly regular trade relations with the Franks.

‘Paganism’ as such was not of course one religion, nor did it clearly have any identifiable center. It is more a name given by the later Christian writers of the early Middle Ages, who are often unfortunately our only source, to the many different forms of religion that they contrasted to Christianity itself and which they associated with backwardness and superstition.2 In fact, what the scant evidence can tell us about the different beliefs of the different regions, it seems to have been a popular animism related to the magical and holy powers of certain natural sites as well as spirits and the like, supplemented with a pantheon of deities representing, as with the Hellenic religion, certain realms of human life as well as certain natural phenomena. Many of the popular practices of religion in fact continued after supposed conversion, not just because Christianity once officially the religion of the people was often not more than skin-deep, but also because spiritual practices unrelated to any specific organized religion as such could well be continued or reinvented within Christianity. That it was necessary for the Christian church in its different forms and locales to cater to this may be attested by the many saints, relics, votives, amulets and whatnot of this period, as well as by the practice of building Christian temples on sites already considered holy.3 The pantheons of the ‘pagan’ religions in the North and East of Europe are unclear, and we often lack accurate information on the details, but generally they seem to have had the same structure as the Greco-Roman ones: a theogony, a polytheistic structure with an all-powerful leading God at the head, and chiefs and kings having powers to lead in the form of their worship and in the sacrificial (and other) rituals, often deriving their authority in this from a family connection to the Gods.4

Why then the conversion of these same ‘pagan’ Kings? Several reasons may be proposed that seem credible. The first is the already mentioned authority of the church, whether Roman-Frankish or Byzantine, and its prestige derived from the Roman Empire, either by inheritance (as in the West) or by descent (as in the East). Especially those kings whose realms were close to the major Christian powers must have felt strong pressure to adopt their religion. This would remove a cause for war against them, which they will have feared, as well as making trade and diplomacy easier and promoting integration into their political structures and alliances, desirable for kings who wished to ensure their own power at the expense of their relative independence. Yet of itself this cannot have been sufficient, since there are too many counter-examples that could be given, in particular since Christian powers have not waged war on each other less than realms with any other religion.

A stronger explanation can be sought in the class relations between the monarch and his subjects. One of the explanations for the seemingly superior powers of conversion on the part of monotheisms generally over polytheist and animist systems of religion can be sought in the fact that rulers wish to integrate the ideology of their realm with their own position in a top-down hierarchy, and if possible wish to reinforce this hierarchy. Even Christian kings in the early Middle Ages had a far from absolute power and were very reliant on their nobility,5 but Christianity’s monotheistic system with one supreme God ruling all subject to him equally, as well as the church’s interpretation of the same as legitimizing the king as steward of people on behalf of God, can easily be seen to reinforce the central power of the early monarch. In fact, there is some evidence that the ‘pagan’ religions themselves underwent a development from animism toward an increasingly strong structure of divine superiority, which we may surmise is a sign of the same process taking place before Christianity presented an ideal opportunity.6 In the case of the latest conversions, we can add to this a development in the theory of the Christian church in which the explicit division of medieval society into the classes of laborers, warriors (rulers) and clergy was defended, this being a product of the process from early feudalism to high feudalism. Such a viewpoint would have been even more convenient to monarchs for their conversion in terms of its explicit endorsement of the hierarchy.7

Then there is what one might call the political problem of the ‘pagan’ theology: namely, their acceptance of the multiplicity of religious forms, precisely because of its own decentralized and particular nature. Monotheist religions necessarily are universalizing and aggressive, because their God ‘is a jealous God’. Polytheist-animist religions however recognize in the world many different loci of holiness and divine or magical powers and many possible Gods, and as such it poses no problem to the belief of the polytheist that some groups worship Jesus when they worship, among others, Perun or Odin. Local Gods would have been difficult to control and the religion relatively hard to centrally dictate and shape by any king, making him prefer a more top-down monotheist approach where the religious rules and forms would be organized and taught by the church system of centrally regulated monasteries and churches. Indeed in practice this centralization had to be enforced by successive series of enforcements of uniformity by Rome (even onto the Counter-Reformation), and often this later also led to fights between the monarchs and the church authority over the right to rule local churches and their doctrine, but for a king seeking to centralize power and establish a regulated administration, polytheistic animism must have been a headache compared to Christianity. As mentioned, ‘pagan’ kings and nobility often supported their claims to power by reference to descent from Gods or giants (as the Ynglinga saga tells us), but the also referred to development of proto-monotheist forms in even these religions before Christianity shows that this must not have been a sufficient guard against the decentralizing egalitarianism of ‘pagan’ animism. This egalitarian animism itself was clearly difficult to wipe out, as shown by the persistence of countless forms of magic, of local saints, of old rites and habits re-interpreted in Christian forms, even to the extent of old imagery and sacrifices, at least among the masses of the people; but the tolerance of polytheism became its undoing, as those proposing a single jealous God would not allow any other, whereas the polytheists were often willing to admit theirs, which alone would ensure the eventual defeat by attrition of the polytheists.

As a final point the influence must be mentioned of the difference between revealed religion and natural religion. Christianity, as a religion ‘of the Book’, relied on writing for its spread, whereas in those days only the elite was capable of reading and writing at all. This control over the rites and the access to the religion on the part of the elite must have been highly tempting to kings even when they could not read and write either (such as Charlemagne), as they could entrust their bureaucracy with it in the form of the literate clergy. Moreover, it is a well-known phenomenon that oral traditions, once in competition with writing, do not survive well, even when it comes to religion. After all, the written form means an orthodoxy is established, there is a single Truth which can be appealed to and which can potentially govern all occasions, whereas the natural religions in their oral traditions rely on the integration of local customs with local circumstances, and are constantly subject to alteration as the circumstances change. It is in a sense too flexible for its own good when faced with written competition; lack of uniformity and localism allows a bureaucracy relying on uniform orthodoxy to impose its will against relatively weak resistance each time, simply by converting each place in turn or stamping out any resistance locally where it would not survive a challenge at hegemonic level. That the clergy involved were often the only form of ‘education’ available, not least in reading and writing, would have been just an added incentive.8 The resistance of people against the new religion of monotheism would have been mostly passive therefore, by maintaining animist beliefs, by lacking interest in the new religion (we know that Christianity in Britain almost died out after the Romans withdrew and a new mission had to be sent much later to rekindle it9), and perhaps by occasional violent revolt; but on the whole, despite the more egalitarian and decentralized nature of the animist-polytheist views, in their original form they were simply no match for the increasingly central bureaucratic powers in Northern and Eastern Europe as feudalism progressed, especially since they had little power to re-establish ‘paganism’ once conversion had officially taken place, even if this did not happen through violence. Indeed, Sir Jack Goody has even gone so far as to say that ‘paganism’ when reliant on oral traditions and local practices alone is incapable of converting anyone itself at all.10

Nowadays, there is something of a small revival of ‘paganism’ in various forms, most of them for want of sources reliant on 19th and 20th Century inventions of tradition and various syntheses of practices from widely differing places and periods. In terms of its appeal to the old paganism, it has little intellectual merit. But perhaps with the demise of the monotheist organized religions and their enforced hierarchy in the developed world, any remaining current of religious and spiritual feeling can be channeled into new forms of this kind, more egalitarian in nature and more permissive of power-subverting politics. If so, it must be careful to learn the lessons of the demise of the old ‘paganisms’ and strengthen itself accordingly.

1. Mayke de Jong, “Religion”, in: Rosamond McKitterick (ed.), The Early Middle Ages (Oxford 2001), p. 134. It must be noted Rome itself had been hostile to Arianism from the very start, as Theodosius I repressed it.->
2. Ibid., p. 146-147.->
3. Ibid., p. 148.->
4. E.g. Barbara Yorke, “The Adaptation of the Anglo-Saxon Royal Courts to Christianity”, in: Martin Carver (ed.), The Cross Goes North: Processes of Conversion in Northern Europe, AD 300-1300 (York 2003), p. 255.->
5. Rosamond McKitterick, “Politics”, in: McKitterick (op. cit.), p. 33-34.->
6. Przemyslaw Urbanczyk, “Politics of Conversion in North Central Europe”, in: Carver (op. cit.), p. 21-22.->
7. Ibid., p. 24.->
8. Ibid. Sir Jack Goody, The Logic of Writing and the Organization of Society (Cambridge 1986), p. 4-18.->
9. Ibid. William Frend, “Roman Britain: A Failed Promise”, in: Carver (op. cit.), p. 79-91.->
10. Goody, p. 4-5.->

Eurocentric history and imperialism

One of the most important ways in which a society can ideologically justify itself, or a class within that society, is through the writing of history. Roman aristocrats wrote histories of Roman politics and society to justify both themselves and their rulers, as well as to attack dynastic opponents and ‘populists’ representing the interests of the Roman poor. For Shakespeare, the Tudor dynasty was to be justified by writing historical plays about their predecessors, where opponents of the ruling dynasty, such as Richard III, appeared as evil schemers. But this is not limited to just political history – it is at least as true for the wondrous science of economic history. Famous is the expression ‘Whiggish history’, referring to the 19th Century British school of history-writing, both political and economic, which saw history as an evolutionary succession of stages of development leading to the final pinnacle of human achievement, Victorian bourgeois society. Marx, of course, combated this by critiquing their political economics, but he also in the process had to rewrite this history of successive modes of production himself, since criticism tends to have the greatest effect when an alternative reading is proposed along with it.

Yet for all his attempts at subverting bourgeois categories, Marx’s historiography was not free of bourgeois Eurocentric assumptions, although it has to be said in his defense that much more of this is known now than at the time. Indeed Friedrich Engels was the greater historian of the two perhaps, and not least because he was more inclined to pay close attention to historiographical developments in the study of ancient and ‘primitive’ societies as well as contemporary non-European ones.1 But he also was limited by the narrow horizons of economic history of that time. A worse example of the same thing is to be found in the explicitly idealist conceptions of Max Weber and to a lesser degree Werner Sombart, together the great exponents and founders of sociology and the German school.

Where Marx had seen non-European societies as essentially inherently stagnant and incapable of development due to the combination of the “idiocy of rural life” in isolated villages with an absolute and bureaucratic power overarching them. This is something to be seen in the context of Marx & Engels’ own experiences with the Prussian bureaucracy they detested. Weber and his group even considered Europe to have developed superior concepts of ‘rationality’ in economics and the idea of cost-benefit analysis free of ideology, which Protestantism had enabled them to do where other religions did not permit it (it is of course no coincidence that the leaders of the German school were all of Protestant background themselves).

It is only in recent times that these views have been succesfully challenged, by both ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ historians. Such people as Goody, Frank, Braudel and Arrighi have systematized our now much more advanced knowledge of economic history in a manner showing beyond question that the West has not always been ahead of the East, nor is the difference to be ascribed to any inherent superiority. In fact, it is only a short period of time that the West can be said to have truly been systematically more advanced: roughly the period from 1750 to 1950. This is a mere 200 years of a history of civilization going back 10.000 years! Yet its impact has been enormous. As Sir Jack Goody writes, “self-congratulation is a zero-sum game”.2 It is then no coincidence that the rise of this self-congratulation coincides with the victory of Europe over the other parts of the world in the equally zero-sum game of imperialist fights over control of zones of plunder and exploitation.

In reality, of course, China and India were clearly ahead of Europe both in technology and living standards until certainly halfway the 16th Century. Joseph Needham’s famous studies of Chinese technology show how practically every major invention of the Middle Ages in Europe was preceded by the same invention in China, often centuries earlier.3 Equally, the development of mercantile capital did not lag behind, despite this having been seen often as something peculiar to the continent, which would explain how Europe came to develop further than any other part of the world had. Although some of the critics also make the error of equating increasing volume of trade with development, like André Gunder Frank does, this is based on a fundamentally false understanding of the point of modes of production. Indeed accumulations of capital gained through (unequal) trade can form the basis for expansion of capitalism as such, but it is not sufficient to point to increases in trade as an independent cause. In any case they were not greater in Europe than in other advanced parts of the world: the great trading cities of China and India, like Guangzhou and Ahmadabad, were no less than Venezia or Antwerpen, both in terms of sophisticated large-scale trading companies and volume of trade.4

As alluded to already, the basis for the European advancement cannot be sought for in differences in trade scope or depth. Both for empirical and methodological reasons: the latter because of the fact, familiar to all but the vulgar economists, that production analytically precedes exchange: there must first be something to trade before trade can take place. Nor is it acceptable to point to inherent differences. Aside from the implicit racism of dubious analyses of the superior ‘rationality’ etc. of Europeans, it doesn’t withstand even the most superficial critical analysis. If Europeans were indeed more rational, then why hadn’t they always been ahead? When these theories were devised, this was widely understood to indeed have been the case, but we know this now to be untrue. And if they had somehow become more rational (or scientific-minded, or freedom-oriented, or individualist, or whatever idealist ’cause’ one wishes to propose), then how was this change possible? Indeed one can hardly think that the European brain changed significantly in its processing functions from one century to the other, even if just for biological reasons. And there is no evidence that one group of people are less capable of dealing with material reality and understanding how to use it than another – indeed there are differences and always have been in terms of specific cultural practices, as well as levels of scientific knowledge and understanding of natural science, but these are the products of the same kind of reasoning. All societies, without exception, exist in and through “the deployment of social labor, mobilized to engage the world of nature”5; something which is only possible because of the capacity for planning and abstraction, something all humans naturally share.

We must therefore do away with this kind of Whiggish history concerning non-European peoples. This is not merely a question of academic science: one need but point to the important role that this Eurocentric ideology has played in actual colonization and imperialism itself, particularly through the idea that the peoples of colonized areas were not endowed with the same capacities for economic reasoning as Europeans, and therefore did not “improve”, which justified stealing their land. To be able to maintain such reasonings, it became essential for European ideologists, from Locke to the current day vulgar economists, to pretend that for whatever cultural, racial or religious reasons the non-European peoples did not possess the economic rationality that allows increases in productivity ‘for the benefit of all’, so that their mere presence on their own living space became a hindrance to the spread of civilization. Indeed, it was best if one could argue that they weren’t just not “improving” now, but that they never had and never could, because otherwise the risk appeared that they could adapt to European methods and so reclaim their stake to the land. The tragic history of Cherokee attempts to compete with the Europeans in the white man’s civilization and according to the white man’s norms is a good example of the real nature of these purported scientific reasonings: those who argue the incapacity of non-European peoples will never permit those peoples to prove them wrong. They would rather destroy them than allow the ideology of European dominance to be undermined, because it would threaten the entirety of the ‘world system’.

This as regards Whiggish economic history. Of course, this critical essay has not yet answered the question itself that is posed by history: namely, how come the Europeans did win, even if just for a short time. The Industrial Revolution and the development of capitalism to its fullest extent were made possible by these European conquests, and in turn enabled them even further, until even India and China were fully under the dominion of foreign powers and the ancient Chinese empire collapsed because of its incapacity to defeat them. If at the beginning of the late Middle Ages we are still at the period “before European hegemony”, as the title of Janet Abu-Lughod’s book indicates6, and yet in 1690 the English had settled in Calcutta and could not be dislodged even by the waning Mughal Empire (heir of the great Timurid realm which had defeated more or less every major empire that had existed at the time)7, then what happened in the meantime? Indeed in about 300 years the European powers must have not only caught up with the great Asian powers, but even surpassed them in development to such a degree that they could not be beaten by them (although it would take until the 18th Century before they could truly enforce their will on any Asian power no matter its size).

Jim Blaut in his excellent studies on the same topic has pointed to the European conquest of the Americas as the main cause.8 The Americas were extraordinarily rich in gold and particularly silver, allowing (despite inflationary effects) a huge surge in essentially ‘free money’ for the European powers. First Castille and Portugal benefited, then, as they collapsed under the strain of internal conflict over the spoils as well as inflation and the massive debts owed to German and Italian bankers (it is not a coincidence that America is probably named for the Italian investment banker Amerigo Vespucci), the baton was taken over by France, England (later to become Britain), and the Netherlands. It may seem odd to some people that such an enormous difference, with such major impact for world history and the current political situation in the world, could be just because of some gold and silver mines in the Americas. Yet this is for an important part true, although some more detail is needed to explain it, which Blaut provides.

The so-called “Manila galleons” as well as the “silver fleet” of Spain carried such large quantities of precious metals to the European continent that there was a 20% increase in the total flow of gold circulating in the entire Eastern Hemisphere as well as a tripling of the total silver flow during the 16th Century.9 The circulation of metal coins increased eight- to ten-fold in the course of the century.10 This meant of course not only a great increase in wealth for the European powers relative to the rest, because they could now buy in Asian markets at prices that nobody in Asia could compete with, but it also meant that this money would spread quickly through all of Europe itself, through trade, payment of debts as well as robbery.11 But it was not just gold that glittered. An at least as essential role was played by the plantation systems the Americas made possible, for reasons of climate as well as the presence of peoples that the Europeans were willing to work to death and yet whose revolts they did not fear. Disease had wiped out the vast majority of the population of the Americas rather soon after the arrival of European conquerors, but the job was further finished by the slave labor plantation system, in particular for the production of sugar. For several centuries sugar production was probably the most profitable industry in existence: sweeteners had always been popular in food worldwide, but the price of sugar had normally far outstripped other products such as honey, making sugar production a relatively marginal enterprise.12 All this changed with the possibility of cheaply mass producing cane sugar in the Caribbean, which for this reason quickly became the most important of all colonies in the world for its possessors. (It is because of this that France gave up its North American colonies so relatively easily – they were considered of little import compared to Haiti, Guadeloupe etc.) Brazil was also a major sugar producing area. Since the natives in the Americas had quickly been wiped out through the combination of diseases and overwork (whereby overwork must be noted to have greatly increased their susceptibility to disease, so that at least part of the millions of deaths from disease ought to be ‘credited’ to the European conquerors as well), it became necessary to abduct and buy millions of slaves from Africa, which played a significant role in destroying what development existed on that continent, due to depopulation and the way slave raids are purely predatory on productive labor. The exports of Brazilian sugar alone in 1600 were in value worth twice the combined total of all English exports to the entire world in that year.13 Clearly the conquest and plunder of the Americas was profitable to the extreme on a world scale, and in just the ‘right’ period too for the leapfrogging of Europe over Asia! Incidentally, North Africa had been the greatest sugar producer before this, and this production was undermined entirely, sending particularly Egypt into an economic decline along the way.14 Finally, the slave trade itself was also highly profitable, and entirely parasitical on Africa and therefore at its expense. Well-known is the rise of the great port cities of Europe in the 17th and 18th Century on the basis of slave trading, such as Amsterdam and Liverpool.

It is therefore not any specific intellectual capacity on the part of Europeans that allowed their conquests of the known world that have shaped the state of our world today. Nor was it purely an internal European development in the 15th Century, as Brenner would have it15, as before 1492 Europe was behind rather than ahead of India and China in terms of economic development, and feudal relations as well as commercial enterprise no different than in England or France. (If anything, the lower taxation of Chinese serfs compared to European ones would give Chinese landlords more room to squeeze them further, giving Chinese peasants in turn more reason to innovate in production methods and to seek to capitalize on production. Or alternatively Chinese peasant income would be higher, which according to Brenner enables them to adopt new technologies better, like English yeoman farmers did. We know however that the opposite happened: Chinese agriculture declined from the late 14th Century on.16) So if it cannot be sought in Europe itself, the solution to the riddle must be sought outside it. And there, indeed, we have the Americas, then African slavery, which in turn gave the impetus for the industrialization that allowed the final subjugation of India and China. In a neat chronological series, the Europeans systematically conquered and/or plundered each continent that was at the time the weakest link in the chain. The conquest of the Americas necessitated the destruction of Africa through the slave trade, which together gave Europe the advantage allowing it to outpace everyone else in wealth and productivity increases, so that it could finally invade India, which was then used as a stick to beat China with. The development of modern medical science, part of the general superiority in technology on the part of the Europeans, also enabled the final colonization of the African inland. And the rest, as they say, is history.

1. See for example his most famous work of this kind, The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State. But Engels has written much more on history, a lot of which has unjustly been neglected in Marxology.->
2. Sir Jack Goody, The East in the West (Cambridge 1996), p. 238.->
3. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China (Cambridge 1956-2004).->
4. For Indian trade, see e.g. the works by K.N. Chaudhuri.->
5. Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley, CA 1982), p. 391.->
6. Janet Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 (Oxford 1991).->
7. Wolf, p. 244.->
8. Jim Blaut, Eight Eurocentric Historians (New York, NY 2000). This is probably the only study of the kind discussed here that even refers to itself as (by implication) “Third Worldist”: see p. 65. Also of relevance is its prequel, The Colonizer’s Model of the World (New York, NY 1993). Both are essential reading on these matters, the best in post-orthodox Marxist scholarship.->
9. Jaime Vicens Vives, An Economic History of Spain (Princeton, NJ 1969). See also Blaut 1993, p. 189.->
10. Pierre Vilar, A History of Gold and Money, 1450-1920 (London 1976). See also Blaut 1993, p. 189.->
11. Indeed in the Netherlands there are still songs about the conquest of a Spanish silver fleet by the Dutch privateer Piet Hein, indicating the importance attached in later times to these forced sharings of the spoils, even if few now remember the context.->
12. Blaut 1993, p. 191.->
13. Ibid.->
14. The Egyptian state (the Mamluk dynasties) had been quite reliant on income from its sugar monopoly since Baybars instated it in 1423. See Fage & Oliver (eds.), The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. III: 1050-1600 (Cambridge 1977), p. 57. The Mamluks were the main power in North Africa and the Palestine-Syria area, so their relative weakening greatly enhanced the possibilities for European expansion in the Middle East in later times.->
15. For more on the Brenner thesis and its relevance to this discussion, see Blaut 2000, p. 45-71.->
16. Wolf, p. 54-56. Cf: Blaut 2000, p. 64-65.->