On the developments in Iran

All of the Islamic Republic of Iran is in an uproar currently over the result of the elections of friday, when incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won with a surprisingly large margin. It was widely expected that he would win a plurality against his main competitor, the more liberal reformer Mousavi, but that the latter would be able to enforce a second round in which his chances of victory looked solid. Mousavi supporters, relying on uncertain but significant circumstantial evidence, are now claiming election fraud, and Mousavi as well as minor candidates on ‘left’ and ‘right’ have formally lodged an appeal with the theocracy’s main clerico-judicial body, the Guardian Council. In the meantime, Teheran has been the scene of many riots and protests by Mousavi supporters as well as Ahmadinejad supporters, and police as well as unidentified armed motorcyclists have operated with violence against the protesters. Even now, a massive demonstration in favor of Mousavi is taking place, and a general strike has been announced for tomorrow.

From a Communist perspective, the situation is complicated. Ahmadinejad appears from what information we have to be favored by the reactionary clergy as well as by the Revolutionary Guards, who control an estimated one-third of the country’s wealth and operate as a paramilitary force for the clerical elite, parasitical upon Iranian society. On the other hand, Ahmadinejad has attempted (albeit with little success) to improve the lot of Iran’s majority of rural poor, and he has a stronger reputation as anti-imperialist than Mousavi does. Mousavi was Prime Minister during the height of the clerical repression, at the time of the conflagration between Iraq and Iran, and as such cannot be said to have a great record when it comes to political repression and state suffocation of democratic forces in Iran, despite his depictions in the Western media as hero of liberalism. It is of course possible that Mousavi would now fare a better course, and he has been campaigning on slightly relaxing the religious strictures of clerical rule in daily life that enforce the submission to the theocracy, but how serious this is is impossible to determine.

It is telling also that Mousavi has the support of the billionaire former President Rafsanjani, who likely sees in him a candidate who can defeat the Revolutionary Guard-supported Ahmadinejad and their economic competition to his interests, which range from transport to oil. Moreover, Mousavi’s presumed new liberal course fares well with the Iranian bourgeoisie, whom Rafsanjani represents, in its various larger cities. Especially Teheran is generally accepted by both parties to be relatively pro-Mousavi, although according to the official results, Ahmadinejad won even there with 52%. The most pro-socialist candidate is the reformist cleric Karroubi, but it was clear from the start that he had no chance of winning. One ought nonetheless to support the most left-wing candidate available in any election, but the fact the Guardian Council pre-emptively removes all candidates except those vetted by them makes of Iranian democracy as much a sham as the American one is, even if it is clearly an improvement over the days of the Shah.

Ahmadinejad’s base of support is generally identified as the rural poor in Iran, peasants as well as rural petty bourgeoisie, who in any nation tend towards conservatism and nationalism. Mousavi can count on the support of the Iranian bourgeoisie, while the clerical class is divided between the supporters of the old order, including the Supreme Leader Khamenei, and liberal clerics inclined to economic if not political reform, such as Rafsanjani himself as well as Khatami. A factor which makes the class division more complicated still is the youth of the Iranian people – the median age is merely 26.4. In any nation, young people are more inclined to support change, of whatever kind, and are more activist besides. They will also identify less with the ‘Islamic Revolution’ of 1979 and the clerical establishment resulting from it, especially in the cities. So while the class divisions currently still favor the clerics, the demographics do not.

What complicates the issue more is the external pressure constantly exercised against Iran’s independence by the United States, Israel, and their lackeys. As always, the imperialists achieve the opposite of their public intent. The Iranian people will reject any threat to their independence from outside, and the greater the threat, the more militarist the system becomes, favoring nationalist and militarist considerations over any other. This sort of militarist deformation resulting from external pressure has been seen before in such countries as the USSR and North Korea, but also in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine, and it shows again how imperial posturing is bad for the peoples it threatens, regardless of how tyrannical their rulers are, and even when the imperialists are impeccable liberals. The result of imperialism is not the removal of tyranny, but its strengthening.

Khamenei has apparently announced that an inquiry will be held by the Guardian Council into the voting count. Regardless of further developments and the real winner of the vote, it is to be encouraged that Iranians use the opportunity to pressure their government into further democratization and into reducing the power of the clerics to channel it towards priestly authority. The greater the power of God, the smaller the power of the people, and the greater the power of God’s representatives, the smaller the power of the people’s representatives. Iran does not need or want the dubious help of America to liberate itself. The Iranians have a chance to do so on their own.

The Challenge of the Taliban

While the American government has decided to prematurely discharge their commander in Afghanistan, McKiernan, from his job and to replace him with a special forces specialist, the army of Pakistan is undertaking a renewed offensive against the Taliban-identified forces in the tribal areas and the Swat valley. This valley used to be an idyllic holiday spot for the Pakistani elite – the entire region is known for its natural beauty due to its rugged characteristics, which greatly hinder operations by modern conventional armies, but give it a great romantic charm – but now some 800.000 are said to have fled as the hammer of war beats the population on the anvil of tribal fanaticism. We can safely assume that the Pakistani army will succeed in driving the Taliban from the areas in the Swat valley that are accessible and relatively close to the capital, since if only for reasons of prestige they cannot fail at this. But Pakistan’s central authority has not had real control over the tribal lands and border area with Afghanistan for a great length of time, and the Taliban resurgence is for an important part to be credited to precisely this; the totally ineffective nature of central government and its bureaucracy in the area has led to passive local support for tribal leaders and clerical authorities resorting to their own measures, which are invariably based on the strictest and cruelest forms of implementation of Islamic religious law and local customs.

Of itself, there is nothing whatever positive to report about either the ideology or the measures of the Taliban (or the medley of tribal-clerical forces operating under this name), neither in Afghanistan nor in Pakistan. But some counter-points must be made.

First of all, the Western presence in Afghanistan is not justified by the ferociousness and cruelty of the Taliban, since not only does the indiscriminate bombing and shelling of the population increase rather than decrease support for the insurgents, but the West as always to retain control is forced to make opportunistic alliances with warlords, sometimes reincarnated as provincial Governors, many of whom are no better than the Taliban. The commander of the Afghan National Army is the feared Tajik warlord Rashid Dostum, whose violent and cruel nature surely matches that of his opponents. With Afghanistan’s reform-minded central government having a very weak urban base in this backward and rural country, reliance on one criminal to defeat the other is inevitable. It does nobody any good for the Western troops to be involved in this.

Secondly, tales of the cruelty of the old leaders, the tyranny of the rulers and the immorality of the barbarian laws have been a pretext for imperialist activity and occupation since the Enlightenment, if not before. Many will perhaps remember still the use of the practice of suttee, or widow-burning, in certain Hindu upper classes being a pretext for British occupation of India. V.G. Kiernan in his excellent history The Lords of Human Kind gives many examples of this. The Mahdi revolt, finally repressed by Kitchener, was described as “unparallelled for horror and human depravity”.1 The disbanding of the Turkish empire was permitted because of its “centuries of unremitting misrule”, its “roguery, corruption and falsehood and deep anti-social selfishness”.2 Bukkhara was to be conquered by Russia because its ruler, the Emir Nasrulla Khan, was “an embodiment of all the country’s degeneracy, an unredeemed tyrant kept going by a swarm of spies, reactionary clergy, and executioners”, and the Khanate of Khiva “weighed down by the most course and unbridled despotism”, its people known for “treachery, mendacity, cruelty and rapacity”.3 The Malays were “the most fierce, treacherous, ignorant and inflexible of barbarians”, which practically begged for conquest; as a certain Major McNair therefore concluded, “it may be taken for granted that amongst the most enlightened Malays there is a disposition to welcome the English”.4 Indeed, no surprise then that a certain George Borrow remarked about the campaign to conquer Sarawak: “What a crown of glory, to carry the blessings of civilization and religion to barbarous, yet at the same time beautiful and romantic lands…”5 This might as well have been a relatively eloquent American officer in Afghanistan today.

Of course, we may have every cause to be enthousiastic about the defeat of such reactionary clergy, local landlords and tribal robber chieftains as can be found among the Taliban. Compared to the feudal serf relations and the religious darkness of old, capitalism and the world market are beyond any doubt an advance. But things are no longer as clear in that regard as they may have been in the 1800s. After all, Afghanistan is already in the world market, as is proven by the agricultural produce of the country, in particular in those areas occupied by the Pashtun landlords favoring the Taliban. If religion is the opium of the people, then in Afghanistan opium surely is the religion of the people. It is by far the most valuable cash crop that the country can produce under current circumstances, and its integration in the world market is shown by the opium of Kandahar becoming the heroin of Los Angeles.

Moreover, as will be shown in a later article on this topic, capitalism does not always relieve the peasantry of semi-feudal burdens or the yoke of feudalistic landlordism. A greater social revolution among the peasantry is needed to achieve this, destroying the landlord class and turning peasants into farmers, while pushing the excess rural population into the cities. This process is the only guarantee of modernization having staying-power in formerly backward areas, as even now Russia shows: impoverished, battered but modern in outlook, despite the recent resurgence of racism out of despair. During the times of the Soviet Union, Russia underwent this process irreversibly, and this has been the guarantee of its future being free of the ignominious backwardness and ignorance of Czarist times. While we encourage the Pakistani government to defeat the Taliban in their regions, and we also hope that after the departure of the Western occupiers the Afghan people will be able to do the same to their variegated warlord groups locked in struggle, from a Marxist perspective it is inevitable that any government to have lasting success in the region must force this revolution upon the peasantry of the mountains of Central Asia, or the peasantry must do this themselves and free themselves of landlordism. The failure of the Babrak Karmal government and its successors to do the former indicates that perhaps the best chance would be the latter, but historical evidence seems to indicate that more often than not the peasantry, when not yet pulled out of ancient tribal and religious modes of thought, is self-defeatingly stubborn, and may require a ‘push’. This is the challenge the Taliban poses: can the countryside of these regions, among the most backwards on the planet, undergo social revolution on its own strength? For it to do this, it requires the oxygen of self-determination, and continued occupation of Afghanistan by Western powers strangles it.

1.V.G. Kiernan, The Lords of Human Kind: Black Man, Yellow Man and White Man in an Age of Empire (Boston, MA 1969), p. 216.->
2.Ibid., p. 114.->
3.Ibid., p. 100-101.->
4.Ibid., p. 83.->
5.Ibid., p. 86.->

On the Present War in Afghanistan

The multinational, NATO-led invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, undertaken in response to the terrorist attack by the islamist organization Al-Qaeda who were said to have been harbored in Afghanistan by the Taliban government, has developed into a disastrous quagmire. Not only has it proven impossible for the imperialist powers of NATO to actually control events in Afghanistan and prevent continuous attacks on their soldiers as well as on the institutions of the newly planted government of Hamid Karzai, but the presence of NATO forces has greatly strengthened both the force and popularity of the Taliban.

The Taliban itself was mostly a Pakistan-based Pashtun organization, appealing to religious sentiment to form a coherent force, which drove out the extortionist warlords of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani and others from the Afghan lands. However, their religious and anti-modernist inventions of tradition with regard to the demands of islam in Afghanistan itself quickly made them not only a byword for deepest obscurantism and religious fanaticism internationally, but also made them intolerable for the Afghan population themselves. Various warlords continued to combat them, while the Afghan people were waiting for an opportunity to rid themselves of all the different forces attempting to subjugate them altogether. However, all experience has shown that all peoples prefer the devil they know to any foreign invader, even if the latter operates under the flag of supposed liberation of the people involved, and Afghanistan also proves this rule true. The Taliban are now stronger than ever, since the devastation wrought by the imperialist forces has caused many an Afghan villager to join the forces of religious illusion, which at least provides the benefits of suggesting a kind of heavenly justice where no earthly order or control can be found. It has also strongly repudiated the foreign occupation of the country, unlike the few imported Afghan liberals which mostly appear as collaborators to a harrassed population seeking peace. The Taliban moreover have a reputation for resisting corruption, as many islamist movements do, and Karzai’s government has been nothing if not corrupt.

What then is the purpose of occupation? Richard Holbrooke, the American envoy in Afghanistan and Pakistan himself has stated the following: “First of all, the victory, as defined in purely military terms, is not achievable, and I cannot stress that too highly. (…) What we’re looking for is the definition of our vital national security interests”.1 Holbrooke recognizes the impossibility of victory even as thousands more soldiers are sent into the country, many pulled out of the other failed American adventure in ‘nation-building’, Iraq. But what then are these national security interests Holbrooke speaks of? Indeed the American government feels aggrieved because the spectacle of the terrorist attacks on New York City itself, heart of the empire of capital, was according to them planned and undertaken from the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan, one of the least developed areas on earth, where old feudal ties and religious barbarism are still strong. The weakest of all attacking the strongest of all in their own base is an example to the world of a kind that the American empire cannot afford.

Yet that is not all. For although enthousiastic American military press articles would have us believe that the fight against their shadowy enemy of Al-Qaeda has achieved major victories with the elimination of some of their top leaders, this is of itself a sideshow. Indeed, the US shows little interest in even bothering with finding Osama Bin Laden, despite this renegade son of the Saudi elite having been depicted as the veritable puppetmaster of ‘international terror’ and the anti-Christ of Western morality for years; by which is meant that prolongation of his very existence after his attack on New York City would be a continuous loss of prestige on the part of the United States and the wealthy nations in general. If they are willing to accept that loss now, what then keeps them in these barren lands?

There are several considerations. The first here is the fact that Afghanistan is the primary producer in the world of opium. That addictive soporific that British imperialism used to destroy the Chinese empire has now turned against its manipulators: the highly addictive drug heroin is produced by means of opium, and heroin is considered a serious blight and instability problem in the Western nations, where great wealth allowing purchase of exotic drugs goes together with great despair and alienation making that purchase desirable. The Taliban, who do not desire any illusions other than their own brand of religious fanaticism, had actually succesfully wiped out much of the opium production in 2001.2 The newly installed pro-Western government in Afghanistan however has not been so successful, since the warfare in Afghanistan has destroyed most opportunities for growing regular crops – indeed, Afghanistan now again produces 92% of the world’s opium, representing half the annual product of the country.3 The Taliban of course have recognized this situation, and are now supporting the opium growers, whom they ‘tax’, providing their main source of income for warfare against the occupiers. Since they no longer attempt to repress the only viable crop in the drought and war-ridden countryside of Afghanistan, this has greatly increased the fervor for islamism on the part of the Afghan farmers. Of course, the effects of opium on Afghanistan’s own institutions can be foreseen: if mighty China’s celestial bureaucracy, the oldest and strongest on earth, could be torn apart by the corruption due to opium within the span of a few decades, what resistance then could former warlords, now government officials, offer to the bribery of the drug trade? The imperialists’ weapon of old is now undermining their very efforts at providing a modern and capital-friendly structure to Afghanistan’s institutions. Yet they dare not give up on it, not just because of the great amount of government and police officials in the United States who are parasitic upon the drug trade and depend on its continued yet ever-failing ‘war on drugs’, but also because if they cannot even determine what crops Afghan farmers shall sow, then this is truly an admission of total defeat in the effort to control Afghanistan’s economy. Indeed, the various invading powers have even had to resort to the ignominious weapon of counter-bribery, but this has mostly failed. This should come as no surprise since local production prices come to about thirty-three dollars from an acre of wheat, and between five hundred and seven hundred dollars from an acre of poppies.3

Karzai’s weakness has also left Afghanistan as wracked by class and ethnic differences as it ever was, meaning that any attempt at ‘nation-building’ by the NATO forces is going to be an exercise in futility, comparable to the game of whack-a-mole. The corruption inherent in the newly installed government has mostly benefited the local landlords, who exploit the share-cropping opium farmers and at the same time take bribes for normal government functions. Many of these landlords are the same people who operated as warlords in the pre-Taliban phase of recent Afghan history. Moreover, the forces from the north, many of ethnic Uzbek and Tajik descent, are angry about the weakness of the resistance against the Pashtun Taliban, who are their old enemies in the struggle over Afghanistan’s agricultural land as well as smuggling routes. Karzai himself is a Pashtun, but few of his ethnicity support him, and it is likely that the old Northern Alliance will reform – an alliance of northern forces that combated the Taliban in the days of their reign. This alliance will challenge Karzai, whose loyalty to their interests they doubt. This year new elections for the presidency of Afghanistan are to be held, and if the northern candidate wins, this means the internal strife in Afghanistan will come even closer to a boiling point, which neither bodes well for the peace of the area and its supposed defenders nor for the Afghan people.

Then there are as ever the considerations of the ‘cash nexus’. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan had a very differentiated and high import tariff system, which used high valuations of the currency to determine its quantity in a given case. The Taliban’s hold over the country was not strong enough to fully enforce this, and indeed effective tariff rates were significantly lower. Nonetheless this formed  a significant source of non-drug income, in particular since many smugglers used Afghanistan to import goods which were subsequently re-exported illegally to Pakistan, a country which also has significant protectionist measures and is very reliant on income from its foreign trade.4 Under the current regime, these tariffs have been significantly lowered, accession to the World Trade Organization is pursued, and further attempts are planned at reducing transport costs and indirect taxes on exporters, mainly in the hope of attracting foreign investment. The importance of export from a poor country like Afghanistan is easy to underestimate: the warlord Achmad Shah Massoud, who led the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, received his main income from taxing the production and export of gems from the mines of the Panjsher Valley in northern Afghanistan, which produce among other things valuables such as lapis lazuli and emeralds.5 Massoud was killed by the Taliban shortly before the attack on New York City of September 11, 2001.

Also of importance concerning trade is the strategic location of Afghanistan: oil and gas-rich countries of Central Asia suffer from poor location and lack of connections to world ports, and Pakistan in particular has aimed at causing a pipeline to be created through Afghanistan, which would connect the Central Asian states with its own ports in Beluchistan by means of Herat. Both the Pakistani and American government as well as such companies as UNOCAL had in fact been negotiating this pipeline just before the events following the Taliban occupation and the Al-Qaeda attacks disrupted the plans. At the same time, the Pakistan-supported Taliban had greatly reduced the costs of transport and security in Afghanistan, which enhanced trade, particularly the above-mentioned smuggling into Pakistan itself. This undermining of Pakistan’s own financial basis, as mentioned very dependent on its transit location, is an activity of Pakistan’s own security forces, which consider their own government to be pro-imperialist and wish to replace it by a religiously inspired resistance regime.5 In the case of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, such neo-Mahdist regimes garner much legitimacy from the lack of legitimacy of the alternatives, in particular the existing and prior state bureaucracies, which have mostly been predators on the extremely poor peasant populations of both countries. The removal of the Taliban by the Western forces has destroyed the safety of the roads that prevailed in most of Afghanistan, which in turn drives local farmers even more towards opium production. Marketing of wheat on the international market legally is now much more difficult than marketing of opium is illegally, even if little of the market price in the West of heroin is captured by the Afghan farmer. Foreign capital, including Chinese mining interests, has however certainly expressed interest in developing Afghanistan’s own gas fields as well as the significant resources of iron ore and coal the country possesses. The USSR had spent hundreds of millions on exploration of these resources when they occupied the country, and if only safety could be guaranteed for capital movements in and out of Afghanistan, it is quite likely that American and other foreign companies shall endeavour to absorb Afghanistan into the world market as well.6

A deal with the Taliban, therefore, seems the most beneficial option for the Western interests. If the Taliban can be appeased and counted on to provide, or at least not disturb, the ‘security’ needed for foreign investment, and in turn the Taliban do not hinder the development of capitalism in that country, then imperialism shall have cleared the way once again for capital’s adventures in foreign shores. The degree of foreign capital’s vulnerability to extortion by the many local landowners, warlords and so forth does not make this likely, however. More likely, the NATO forces shall be forced to withdraw sooner or later after having to deal with the Taliban on the latter’s terms, and much shall be as it was before in Afghanistan. The tens of thousands of dead Afghans and the loss of men and prestige on the part of the Western empires will be the only ‘result’ of the Afghan expedition.

1.Associated Press article, Feb. 18, 2009.->
2.“Opioids in Afghanistan”. http://www.opioids.com/afghanistan/index.html. ->
3.Anderson, J.L. “The Taliban’s Opium War”. The New Yorker (July 9, 2007).->
4.“Afghanistan: Trade Policy and Integration”. World Bank report. http://go.worldbank.org/ORI5Y663A0. ->
5.Rubin, B. The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan. Council on Foreign Relations, 1999.->
6.Daly, J.C.K. “Analysis: Afghanistan’s untapped energy riches”. UPI article, Oct. 24, 2008. Also: “Ahadi: Afghanistan’s Economic Fortunes”, interview by Greg Bruno. Council on Foreign Relations, Apr. 15, 2008.->

Eurocentric history and imperialism

One of the most important ways in which a society can ideologically justify itself, or a class within that society, is through the writing of history. Roman aristocrats wrote histories of Roman politics and society to justify both themselves and their rulers, as well as to attack dynastic opponents and ‘populists’ representing the interests of the Roman poor. For Shakespeare, the Tudor dynasty was to be justified by writing historical plays about their predecessors, where opponents of the ruling dynasty, such as Richard III, appeared as evil schemers. But this is not limited to just political history – it is at least as true for the wondrous science of economic history. Famous is the expression ‘Whiggish history’, referring to the 19th Century British school of history-writing, both political and economic, which saw history as an evolutionary succession of stages of development leading to the final pinnacle of human achievement, Victorian bourgeois society. Marx, of course, combated this by critiquing their political economics, but he also in the process had to rewrite this history of successive modes of production himself, since criticism tends to have the greatest effect when an alternative reading is proposed along with it.

Yet for all his attempts at subverting bourgeois categories, Marx’s historiography was not free of bourgeois Eurocentric assumptions, although it has to be said in his defense that much more of this is known now than at the time. Indeed Friedrich Engels was the greater historian of the two perhaps, and not least because he was more inclined to pay close attention to historiographical developments in the study of ancient and ‘primitive’ societies as well as contemporary non-European ones.1 But he also was limited by the narrow horizons of economic history of that time. A worse example of the same thing is to be found in the explicitly idealist conceptions of Max Weber and to a lesser degree Werner Sombart, together the great exponents and founders of sociology and the German school.

Where Marx had seen non-European societies as essentially inherently stagnant and incapable of development due to the combination of the “idiocy of rural life” in isolated villages with an absolute and bureaucratic power overarching them. This is something to be seen in the context of Marx & Engels’ own experiences with the Prussian bureaucracy they detested. Weber and his group even considered Europe to have developed superior concepts of ‘rationality’ in economics and the idea of cost-benefit analysis free of ideology, which Protestantism had enabled them to do where other religions did not permit it (it is of course no coincidence that the leaders of the German school were all of Protestant background themselves).

It is only in recent times that these views have been succesfully challenged, by both ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ historians. Such people as Goody, Frank, Braudel and Arrighi have systematized our now much more advanced knowledge of economic history in a manner showing beyond question that the West has not always been ahead of the East, nor is the difference to be ascribed to any inherent superiority. In fact, it is only a short period of time that the West can be said to have truly been systematically more advanced: roughly the period from 1750 to 1950. This is a mere 200 years of a history of civilization going back 10.000 years! Yet its impact has been enormous. As Sir Jack Goody writes, “self-congratulation is a zero-sum game”.2 It is then no coincidence that the rise of this self-congratulation coincides with the victory of Europe over the other parts of the world in the equally zero-sum game of imperialist fights over control of zones of plunder and exploitation.

In reality, of course, China and India were clearly ahead of Europe both in technology and living standards until certainly halfway the 16th Century. Joseph Needham’s famous studies of Chinese technology show how practically every major invention of the Middle Ages in Europe was preceded by the same invention in China, often centuries earlier.3 Equally, the development of mercantile capital did not lag behind, despite this having been seen often as something peculiar to the continent, which would explain how Europe came to develop further than any other part of the world had. Although some of the critics also make the error of equating increasing volume of trade with development, like André Gunder Frank does, this is based on a fundamentally false understanding of the point of modes of production. Indeed accumulations of capital gained through (unequal) trade can form the basis for expansion of capitalism as such, but it is not sufficient to point to increases in trade as an independent cause. In any case they were not greater in Europe than in other advanced parts of the world: the great trading cities of China and India, like Guangzhou and Ahmadabad, were no less than Venezia or Antwerpen, both in terms of sophisticated large-scale trading companies and volume of trade.4

As alluded to already, the basis for the European advancement cannot be sought for in differences in trade scope or depth. Both for empirical and methodological reasons: the latter because of the fact, familiar to all but the vulgar economists, that production analytically precedes exchange: there must first be something to trade before trade can take place. Nor is it acceptable to point to inherent differences. Aside from the implicit racism of dubious analyses of the superior ‘rationality’ etc. of Europeans, it doesn’t withstand even the most superficial critical analysis. If Europeans were indeed more rational, then why hadn’t they always been ahead? When these theories were devised, this was widely understood to indeed have been the case, but we know this now to be untrue. And if they had somehow become more rational (or scientific-minded, or freedom-oriented, or individualist, or whatever idealist ’cause’ one wishes to propose), then how was this change possible? Indeed one can hardly think that the European brain changed significantly in its processing functions from one century to the other, even if just for biological reasons. And there is no evidence that one group of people are less capable of dealing with material reality and understanding how to use it than another – indeed there are differences and always have been in terms of specific cultural practices, as well as levels of scientific knowledge and understanding of natural science, but these are the products of the same kind of reasoning. All societies, without exception, exist in and through “the deployment of social labor, mobilized to engage the world of nature”5; something which is only possible because of the capacity for planning and abstraction, something all humans naturally share.

We must therefore do away with this kind of Whiggish history concerning non-European peoples. This is not merely a question of academic science: one need but point to the important role that this Eurocentric ideology has played in actual colonization and imperialism itself, particularly through the idea that the peoples of colonized areas were not endowed with the same capacities for economic reasoning as Europeans, and therefore did not “improve”, which justified stealing their land. To be able to maintain such reasonings, it became essential for European ideologists, from Locke to the current day vulgar economists, to pretend that for whatever cultural, racial or religious reasons the non-European peoples did not possess the economic rationality that allows increases in productivity ‘for the benefit of all’, so that their mere presence on their own living space became a hindrance to the spread of civilization. Indeed, it was best if one could argue that they weren’t just not “improving” now, but that they never had and never could, because otherwise the risk appeared that they could adapt to European methods and so reclaim their stake to the land. The tragic history of Cherokee attempts to compete with the Europeans in the white man’s civilization and according to the white man’s norms is a good example of the real nature of these purported scientific reasonings: those who argue the incapacity of non-European peoples will never permit those peoples to prove them wrong. They would rather destroy them than allow the ideology of European dominance to be undermined, because it would threaten the entirety of the ‘world system’.

This as regards Whiggish economic history. Of course, this critical essay has not yet answered the question itself that is posed by history: namely, how come the Europeans did win, even if just for a short time. The Industrial Revolution and the development of capitalism to its fullest extent were made possible by these European conquests, and in turn enabled them even further, until even India and China were fully under the dominion of foreign powers and the ancient Chinese empire collapsed because of its incapacity to defeat them. If at the beginning of the late Middle Ages we are still at the period “before European hegemony”, as the title of Janet Abu-Lughod’s book indicates6, and yet in 1690 the English had settled in Calcutta and could not be dislodged even by the waning Mughal Empire (heir of the great Timurid realm which had defeated more or less every major empire that had existed at the time)7, then what happened in the meantime? Indeed in about 300 years the European powers must have not only caught up with the great Asian powers, but even surpassed them in development to such a degree that they could not be beaten by them (although it would take until the 18th Century before they could truly enforce their will on any Asian power no matter its size).

Jim Blaut in his excellent studies on the same topic has pointed to the European conquest of the Americas as the main cause.8 The Americas were extraordinarily rich in gold and particularly silver, allowing (despite inflationary effects) a huge surge in essentially ‘free money’ for the European powers. First Castille and Portugal benefited, then, as they collapsed under the strain of internal conflict over the spoils as well as inflation and the massive debts owed to German and Italian bankers (it is not a coincidence that America is probably named for the Italian investment banker Amerigo Vespucci), the baton was taken over by France, England (later to become Britain), and the Netherlands. It may seem odd to some people that such an enormous difference, with such major impact for world history and the current political situation in the world, could be just because of some gold and silver mines in the Americas. Yet this is for an important part true, although some more detail is needed to explain it, which Blaut provides.

The so-called “Manila galleons” as well as the “silver fleet” of Spain carried such large quantities of precious metals to the European continent that there was a 20% increase in the total flow of gold circulating in the entire Eastern Hemisphere as well as a tripling of the total silver flow during the 16th Century.9 The circulation of metal coins increased eight- to ten-fold in the course of the century.10 This meant of course not only a great increase in wealth for the European powers relative to the rest, because they could now buy in Asian markets at prices that nobody in Asia could compete with, but it also meant that this money would spread quickly through all of Europe itself, through trade, payment of debts as well as robbery.11 But it was not just gold that glittered. An at least as essential role was played by the plantation systems the Americas made possible, for reasons of climate as well as the presence of peoples that the Europeans were willing to work to death and yet whose revolts they did not fear. Disease had wiped out the vast majority of the population of the Americas rather soon after the arrival of European conquerors, but the job was further finished by the slave labor plantation system, in particular for the production of sugar. For several centuries sugar production was probably the most profitable industry in existence: sweeteners had always been popular in food worldwide, but the price of sugar had normally far outstripped other products such as honey, making sugar production a relatively marginal enterprise.12 All this changed with the possibility of cheaply mass producing cane sugar in the Caribbean, which for this reason quickly became the most important of all colonies in the world for its possessors. (It is because of this that France gave up its North American colonies so relatively easily – they were considered of little import compared to Haiti, Guadeloupe etc.) Brazil was also a major sugar producing area. Since the natives in the Americas had quickly been wiped out through the combination of diseases and overwork (whereby overwork must be noted to have greatly increased their susceptibility to disease, so that at least part of the millions of deaths from disease ought to be ‘credited’ to the European conquerors as well), it became necessary to abduct and buy millions of slaves from Africa, which played a significant role in destroying what development existed on that continent, due to depopulation and the way slave raids are purely predatory on productive labor. The exports of Brazilian sugar alone in 1600 were in value worth twice the combined total of all English exports to the entire world in that year.13 Clearly the conquest and plunder of the Americas was profitable to the extreme on a world scale, and in just the ‘right’ period too for the leapfrogging of Europe over Asia! Incidentally, North Africa had been the greatest sugar producer before this, and this production was undermined entirely, sending particularly Egypt into an economic decline along the way.14 Finally, the slave trade itself was also highly profitable, and entirely parasitical on Africa and therefore at its expense. Well-known is the rise of the great port cities of Europe in the 17th and 18th Century on the basis of slave trading, such as Amsterdam and Liverpool.

It is therefore not any specific intellectual capacity on the part of Europeans that allowed their conquests of the known world that have shaped the state of our world today. Nor was it purely an internal European development in the 15th Century, as Brenner would have it15, as before 1492 Europe was behind rather than ahead of India and China in terms of economic development, and feudal relations as well as commercial enterprise no different than in England or France. (If anything, the lower taxation of Chinese serfs compared to European ones would give Chinese landlords more room to squeeze them further, giving Chinese peasants in turn more reason to innovate in production methods and to seek to capitalize on production. Or alternatively Chinese peasant income would be higher, which according to Brenner enables them to adopt new technologies better, like English yeoman farmers did. We know however that the opposite happened: Chinese agriculture declined from the late 14th Century on.16) So if it cannot be sought in Europe itself, the solution to the riddle must be sought outside it. And there, indeed, we have the Americas, then African slavery, which in turn gave the impetus for the industrialization that allowed the final subjugation of India and China. In a neat chronological series, the Europeans systematically conquered and/or plundered each continent that was at the time the weakest link in the chain. The conquest of the Americas necessitated the destruction of Africa through the slave trade, which together gave Europe the advantage allowing it to outpace everyone else in wealth and productivity increases, so that it could finally invade India, which was then used as a stick to beat China with. The development of modern medical science, part of the general superiority in technology on the part of the Europeans, also enabled the final colonization of the African inland. And the rest, as they say, is history.

1. See for example his most famous work of this kind, The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State. But Engels has written much more on history, a lot of which has unjustly been neglected in Marxology.->
2. Sir Jack Goody, The East in the West (Cambridge 1996), p. 238.->
3. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilisation in China (Cambridge 1956-2004).->
4. For Indian trade, see e.g. the works by K.N. Chaudhuri.->
5. Eric Wolf, Europe and the People Without History (Berkeley, CA 1982), p. 391.->
6. Janet Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350 (Oxford 1991).->
7. Wolf, p. 244.->
8. Jim Blaut, Eight Eurocentric Historians (New York, NY 2000). This is probably the only study of the kind discussed here that even refers to itself as (by implication) “Third Worldist”: see p. 65. Also of relevance is its prequel, The Colonizer’s Model of the World (New York, NY 1993). Both are essential reading on these matters, the best in post-orthodox Marxist scholarship.->
9. Jaime Vicens Vives, An Economic History of Spain (Princeton, NJ 1969). See also Blaut 1993, p. 189.->
10. Pierre Vilar, A History of Gold and Money, 1450-1920 (London 1976). See also Blaut 1993, p. 189.->
11. Indeed in the Netherlands there are still songs about the conquest of a Spanish silver fleet by the Dutch privateer Piet Hein, indicating the importance attached in later times to these forced sharings of the spoils, even if few now remember the context.->
12. Blaut 1993, p. 191.->
13. Ibid.->
14. The Egyptian state (the Mamluk dynasties) had been quite reliant on income from its sugar monopoly since Baybars instated it in 1423. See Fage & Oliver (eds.), The Cambridge History of Africa, Vol. III: 1050-1600 (Cambridge 1977), p. 57. The Mamluks were the main power in North Africa and the Palestine-Syria area, so their relative weakening greatly enhanced the possibilities for European expansion in the Middle East in later times.->
15. For more on the Brenner thesis and its relevance to this discussion, see Blaut 2000, p. 45-71.->
16. Wolf, p. 54-56. Cf: Blaut 2000, p. 64-65.->